Assessing the impacts of projects which displace households and businesses by Mahady, Francis Xavier
"No" 1- 0'!111"v11 *v
ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF PROJECTS
WHICH DISPLACE HOUSEHOLDS AND BUSINESSES
by
Francis X. Mahady
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of City Planning
at the
Massachusetts Institute "f Technology
May, 1976
_ / /I
Signature of
Certified by
Accepted by
df/ilrbah iudies KA
T s 1epVsor
D'eparthint Chairman
Planning
I I(AJ. -Ah
ii ~c ~ -________ --- ________ _________
(NOV 830 1976)
II
Authort, '-.
Teddrt'me adt
II II
PREFACE
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In 1970, Mrs. M., an elderly widow, was liv-ing alone in a mobile park
home adjacent to Route 1 in Peabody, Massachusetts. For a number of
years she and her neighbors had suspected that they would be required
to move for construction of Interstate 95. Early in 1970 official no-
tice to vacate was sent by the state Department of Public Works. For
over a year Mrs. M. and other mobile home residents sought replacement
accomodations, but the restrictive policies of mobile home park opera-
tors prevented them from moving their dwellings, and their very low
incomes made other choices prohibitive. Pressed by construction delays
and numerous correspondence from the state Department of Community Af-
fairs , officials of the Department of Public Works reluctantly agreed
to let the mobile home dwellers move to unused state-owned maintenance
depot property nearby. Mrs. M., unfamiliar with the details of such
a move, requested assistance from the Department of Public Work's
right-of-way agents.2 The Assistant Director of Relocation for the
Department of Public Works provided Mrs. M. the name of a contractor
who, it was claimed, would level an appropriate piece of land, move
her mobile home, and make all necessary utility connections (and who,
incidentally, was and is a personal friend of the Assistant Supervisor
of Relocation). Mrs. M. contacted the contractor and paid in advance
the substantial sum requested for his services.
1. An agency whose legislative mandate required them to review all dis-
placement programs carried out by state or local public agencies.
2. Such "Relocation Advisory Assistance", as well as the building of
replacement housing, if necessary, was at the time, and is today, an ex-
plicit provision of Federal and state law and regulations.
_________ 
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Several months later officials of the Department of Community Affairs
received copies of letters Mrs. M. had sent to the Department of Public
Works, the Federal Highway Administration3 , as well as local elected of-
ficials, complaining that she had not received adequate relocation as-
sistance, despite numerous requests, and that the state-recommended con-
tractor had failed to make her home livable in its replacement location.
An on-site inspection by Community Affairs representatives substantiated
the complaints. The land on which the mobile home was placed had never
been leveled, and the dwelling was tilting 20 degrees. No utility con-
nections had been made. Mrs. M., over 70 years old and crippled on one
side by arthritis, provided her own light, cooking, and heat by candle.
Water was being taken from a neighbor's garden hose. She had been defe-
cating into plastic bags which she buried outside.
The details of Mrs. M's plight were again brought to the attention of
responsible officials of the Department of Public Works and Federal
Highway Administration, this time by letter from the Department of Com-
munity Affairs and several telephone calls. However, staff of the De-
partment of Public Works were already well aware of the details, and the
fact that the situation had gone unattended for several months. Their
agents had been in constant contact with Mrs. M. The agency's official
position, expressed repeatedly by the Assistant Director of Relocation
and his superiors, was that Mrs. M's problem with the contractor "is
none of our business." Federal Highway Administration officials agreed
that the Department of Public Works had not done an adequate job of re-
3. The Federal Highway Administration must approve of, and monitor, all
state Highway Agencies' relocation activities whenever Federal funds are
involved.
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5location assistance. They we.ce reluctant, however, to take any action
that might jeopardize or delay construction of the highway, they said,
or in any way cast the overall project in a bad light.
No one admonished the contractor on behalf of Mrs. M. No offers were
made by agency officials for substitute contracting work. There was
no change in Mrs. M's situation by the fall of 1971, months after her
letters reached the responsible officials. Before the end of the year
she was dead from pneumonia.
Although extreme by most measures of relocation casework, the story
of Mrs. M. is not so rare and exceptional as we might hope. The fact
that it occurred only recently in a State noted for liberal advocacy,
political sensitivity and acumen, cannot be very reassuring to those
who would like to believe that the disruptive, inhuman effects of forced
relocation -- so well documented in congressional testimonies, planning
and sociological reports of the 1960's -- are events of the past. The
problem is underscored by noting that, without exception, the principals
of the Federal and State highway agencies involved in the Mrs. M. case,
hold the same or higher positions administering government relocation
programs.
Somehow the life of Mrs. M. fell between the cracks of social programs
which, after three decades of efforts to establish protective laws and
administrative procedures, was supposed to assure that "... persons
shall not suffer disproportionate injury as a result of programs de-
4. The State Department of Community Affairs no longer monitors reloca-
tion activities of the highway agency. New staff effected legislative
and policy changes that have placed them outside major displacing ac-
tivities.
signed for the benefit of the public as a whole." 5 Unfortunately, the
attitude of most displacing agency officials, and many planners and
politicians as well, is quite the contrary -- namely, that public pro-
jects have some inevitable bad effects that must be borne by a few in-
dividuals. A belief that the individual citizen bears primary responsi-
bility for the effects of government action, or inaction, is widely held.
D.P. Moynihan, former Presidential advisor on urban affairs and U.N. Am-
bassador, expressed the generalized sentiment quite elegantly in a re-
cent newspaper interview: "Well, the only reason Americans are star-
ving is because they're idiots... it's a wholly individualized thing...
What kind of people are we? We do not let people starve in this coun-
try." 6 Such attitudes, and the self-assuasive admissions of imperfec-
tion by responsible public officials, have obvious effects on the plan-
ning and administration of relocation programs. They are a part, but
by no means all of the problem.
The thesis is divided into four chapters, which are intended to pro-
vide different contexts for viewing the relocation process, and differ-
ent aspects of the problem. Each stands independent of the others as
well as, hopefully, sustaining a sequential narrative for the whole.
Chapter One (which could logically be placed at the end as much as the
beginning) is an overview that covers many of the concerns elaborated
5. From the Declaration of Policy of the Federal Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act of 1970. P.L. 91-646, Sec. 201.
6. Boston Globe, May 3, 1976.
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upon in other chapters. It focuses on patterns observed in the reloca-
tion experience that may be generalized to technical and political is-
sues of broader interest. It's called "The Politics of Felocation".
Chapter Two is "Federal Agencies and the Courts: the problem of liti-
gation on behalf of relocatees". Its emphasis is on providing legal
case refe-rences and a -trategy for using the courts on behalf of relo-
catees. Limits for judicial intervention are suggested. The first part
of Chapter Two is also the background discussion of issues in relocation
planning and implementation that, in the author's judgement, are most
crucial to present practice. Chapter Three, entitled "Participation
and Effect: case studies of tactics to improve the relocation process",
analyzes some political dynamics the author has experienced in various
professional roles over the past six years. It is directed towards
those who will participate as technical planners in public agencies,
consultant firms, or in ad hoc advisory capacities. Chapter Four, "An
Impact Assessment Methodology in Perspective", describes the efforts
that were made over three years to introduce new relocation practices
into the day to day operation of Massachusetts' major displacing agency,
the Department. of Public Works. It suggests a simple, rational method-
ology that planners and others may apply in working on Environmental Im-
pact Statements, public agency programs, or any concerns of neighborhood
housing and commercial market structure. Variables that affect the
choice of analytic method, such as public participation and government
bureaucracy, are discussed.
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THE POLITICS OF RELOCATION
Introduction
The term "politics" in this chapter, as elsewhere in the thesis, re-
fers to the implicit power relations that shape behavior. Its usage
is not limited to what we commonly call the political process, having
to do with elected officials, public and private interest factions.
And it reasons that technocrats and technical process, including what
we often think of as objective analytic method, lie well within the in-
fluence of politics. Hopefully, the logic of this meaning will be made
clear through the concrete examples which follow.
Massachusetts has been a particularly interesting State in which to
observe, and participate in the politics of relocation. In 1965, Chap-
ter 79A of the General Laws established the Bureau of Relocation, De-
partment of Community Affairs, as the first State agency specifically
legislated to review the relocation plans and programs of other agencies.
Its involvement in renewal, highway, and other public projects during
the years 1968-1973, when it carried a staff of dedicated, qualified
professionals, provides a rich source of strategies for agency interven-
tion on behalf of relocatees. Chapter Three discusses some of these in
detail, while the interest here is in showing how such an organization
fit into programs normally dominated by the more powerful displacing a-
gencies.
In 1970, the Governor halted highway construction within the major
metropolitan area, also a nationwide first, and part of the considera-
tion was the expected impacts of displacing families and businesses.
The forum which followed for review of transportation decisions was to
11
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set precedents for public participatory, interagency, and intermodal
planning that have had direct consequences to relocation programs, here
and elsewhere. Capitalizing on the impetus for change provided by this
Boston Transportation Planning Review (see Chapter Three), efforts were
made to introduce new practices into the day to day operation of the
State's major displacing agency and largest public bureaucracy, the De-
partment of Public Works. A number of changes were made in organization
and staffing, and new techniques set for program planning and implemen-
tation. These are analyzed in detail in Chapter Four from a perspective
inside the displacing agency. The emphasis here is on evaluating the
extent of Federal and State agency influence in the government system
and on general concerns to the planner in applying analytic method to
the impacts of dislocation.
I. The Rise and Fall of the Bureau of Relocation
It is not surprising that Massachusetts lawmakers made their State the
first to have a Bureau of Relocation. By the mid 1960's there had been
completed, or were underway, massive displacements of families and bus-
inesses for highway and/or renewal projects in Boston, Worcester, Spring-
field, Chicopee-Holyoke, and plans were underway for more large scale
relocations in these municipalities and others, including Cambridge,
Somerville, Lowell, Lawrence, New Bedford and Fall River. In each of
these communities the experience had been much the same -- frustrated
and bitter constituents were pressing their elected officials with de-
mands for change. Newspaper and research accounts brought the problem
to an audience much wider than those directly involved. Studies of Bos-
ton's ill-fated West End, for example, by Herbert Gansi, Chester Hartman,
U- if
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Marc Fried3 and others, had made the failures of that project a cause
celebre for anti-renewal forces throughout the country. To Massachu-
setts' elected officials it meant that their pet sources of patronage
jobs (highway and renewal agencies) and campaign funding (highway and
building contractors, real estate developers) were becoming a public em-
barassment.
In 1965, the Massachusetts legislature appendixed to the State's em-
inent domain statute a chapter (79A, MOL) requiring minimum payments
and advisory assistance to all households and businesses displaced by
agencies with eminent domain powers. The legislation also established
a Bureau of Relocation with authority to 1) forestall acquisition and
relocation until a plan had been prepared showing adequate housing and
commercial resources would be available for the households and business-
es to be displaced, and 2) suspend relocation activities if the agen-
cies were found to be violating provisions of the approved plan. Chap-
ter 79A was hailed as landmark social legislation, at a time when no
comparable Federal laws existed. (The story behind its passage is an
interesting one, but beyond the scope of this discussion.) Finally,
it was felt, relocatees would receive the protection they needed facing
the displacing agencies limited objectives for clearance of acquired
properties.
1. Herbert Gans, The Urban Villagers, The Free Press, N.Y. 1962.
2. Chester Hartman, "The Housing of Relocated Families".
3. Marc Fried "Grieving for a Lost Home: The Psychological Costs of
Relocation" reprinted in Wilson: Urban Renewal: The Record and the
Controversy, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1966.
Unfortunately, the original staff of the Bwreau of Relocation (BOR)
proved unprepared for the inevitable confrontations with displacing a-
gency power. Without exception, their previous experience had been in
strict planning capacities. The wholly pragmatic, politically pressured
world of the relocation caseworker and project administrator was unknown
to them. Although motivated to upgrade the process on behalf of relo-
catees, the original BOR staff lacked the knowledge to -be able to con-
vince the displacing agencies that they really understood what was go-
ing on. They could not express their often well-founded suspicions of
inadequate planning and administration of relocation programs effective-
ly enough to challenge the opposition of the displacing agencies. In
uncertainty they backed down, or were assuaged by project administrators
into believing that the latter's well-stated intentions would be enough
to solve the problem. When a strong position was taken, as in attempted
suspension of the BRA's South End relocation, they misjudged support
,from above and had to withdraw without much effect.
In spite of these limitations, within two years the original BOR staff
had made some important progress. Through on-site inspections of pro-
grams, they had made the BOR visible in the relocation game. And their
response to the complaints of relocatees and advocate groups had shown
displacing agencies that there was an entity, armed with potential le-
gal sanction, that would intervene on behalf of relocatees. Finally,
the BOR's review of relocation plans had upgraded the documentation re-
quired for housing and commercial market resources. In some cases they
were able to gain relocatees precious lead-time in their search for re-
placement housing and business facilities. At the very least, displa-
________ Ii
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cing agencies were aware that they would have to be more careful than
in their unfettered past.
Dramatic changes in the BOR's methods were made following the appoint-
ment of E. William Richardson as its director in 1968. Richardson had
been relocation program director for the Boston Redevelopment Authority
on the Boston Rehabilitiation Project in Roxbury, and for the Charles-
town Urban Renewal Project. He was well-versed in administrative tech-
niques, as well as the arts of political persuasion. Richardson re-
staffed the BOR with seasoned relocation caseworkers -- Judy Hart, also
a former BRA employee, and Frank O'Connor, a ten year veteran of relo-
cation programs in several comnunities. Following a strategy of metic-
ulous review of relocation plans and advisory assistance efforts, ce-
mented by the considerable experience of its staff, the new BOR com-
manded respect from displacing agencies. .Changes were made in their
conduct of relocation programs.
The tactics of this BOR were subtle. Richardson knew that the stat-
ute was authoritatively worded, but potentially untestable. If it came
to a showdown between the BOR and another State agency, like the high-
way department, the latter would likely win out. The Governor, after
all, controlled both, and great political importance was vested in the
construction projects. The problem would be less acute with the renew-
al agencies, which were municipally controlled, but even there a stand-
off could anger legislators or other interestes closer to the Governor's
support. These considerations, of course, had to be faced by the dis-
placing agency heads as well. They would want to avoid bad publicity,
delays in execution of their projects, or having to call on the Gover-
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nor's intervention. Given this dynamic, it was clear that the BOR had
to appear to be a paragon of reasonableness, while at the same time in-
sisting on letter of the law application on behalf of relocatees. Some-
how Richardson and his staff were able to accomplish this by painstak-
ingly wording official correspondence to read, on the surface, like pos-
itive recommendations for improvements to agency practice, while imply-
ing that the full weight of the law could, and would, be brought to bear
against non-compliance. Their personal styles complimented the written
word -- outwardly patient, cooperative, and assuring, while communica-
ting a resolve that the job called for would get done.
Following Richardson's promotion to Deputy Commissioner of Community
Affairs, Judy Hart was appointed director of the relocation bureau. She
continued the standards of professionalism and political acumen, adding
a thoroughness for review of plans and casework performance that be-
came exasperating to the opponents of continuous improvement in relo-
cation programs. The BOR was conducting its own housing and commercial
market studies, to test the validity of agency claims for relocation re-
sources, and in certain instances was providing its staff to assist
communities in developing effective casework techniques. In addition,
the BOR was now involved in the earliest stages of renewal project de-
velopment, and was able to promote provision of low cost replacement
housing where necessary. These efforts were possible only because the
BOR had fostered an image of competent, objective review of displacing
agency programs, and an insistence to pursue its objectives using tech-
niques like those described above. Their committment culminated in a
brilliant technical case against the Park Plaza Renewal proposal of
16
Mortimer Zuckerman and the BRA, described in detail in Chapter Three.
Unfortunately, Park Plaza presaged the end of the BOR as an effective
force on behalf of relocatees and responsive renewal planning. Contro-
versy over that project forced the resignation of Richardson, then Act-
ing Commissioner of Community Affairs and one of three DCA Commissioners
who would leave in protest over the Governor's insistence that Park Pla-
za go ahead (Miles Mahoney, Richardson's successor, and Leon Charkoudian,
his predecessor, were the other two). Judy Hart soon followed suit. Ms.
Hart's successor as relocation bureau director, Karen Falat, and her boss
DCA Commissioner Lewis Crampton, did not believe that displacing agencies
should be confronted in the ways their predecessors had developed. Park
Plaza was approved. They took a more conciliatory approach in their re-
!!view of other projects as well. Eventually, they were duped, mainly by
the Department of Public Work's Right of Way Director John Sheehy, into
changing Chapter 79A so that the statute no longer required the BOR to
approve a relocation plan before a displacing agency could acquire prop-
erty. Since Ms. Hart's departure, according to present staff, the BOR has
not monitored te relocation casework of displacing agencies. They look a
relocation plans, which are now submitted for "informational purposes",
and make suggestions to the displacing agencies' search for replacement
housing and business resources.
II. Impacts and Analytic Method
Impacts due to displacement differ vastly by the type of household,
neighborhood, housing and commercial markets affected. These are dis-
cussed in detail in Chapters Two, Three, and Four. The following sum-
marizes characteristic concerns:
1) Elderly, low income, female headed, ethnic or racial minority,
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and large family households usually experience the greatec+. difficulties
finding replacement accomodations or adjusting to change caused by the
move. Their choices for relocation are limited by constraints in the
supply of suitable replacement housing, or the restrictive practices
of landlords. In the case of elderly or other long term occupants, al-
tering the cDnditions of their residence can cause severe disruption,
even trauma, that is seldom effectively offset. Various, studies
have shown that, especially for households that were unstable prior to
relocation, the crises imposed by moving may a) increase rates of sepa-
ration and divorce, b) lower measures of internal cohesion, such as
feelings of cooperation between members, c) lower household income (par-
tially a result of break-ups and reduction in family members living at
home), d) lower satisfaction with neighbors and surroundings (though,
conversely, increased satisfaction with the dwelling is often indicated)
and e) lower the expected survival age of elderly displacees. In al-
most all cases, expenditures for housing take a higher proportion of
household income after relocation. In most cases, there are fewer rooms
and area of living space in the replacement dwelling. Those who rent
typically score lower on all measures than those who purchase reloca-
tion housing.
2) Neighborhoods that comprise a relatively high proportion of long
term residents, whether owners or renters, may experience population
change, housing disinvestment, and absolute loss of residents in greater
numbers than the actual displacements. Working class neighborhoods are
especially susceptible to disruption from relocation. (See Chapter One
Appendix).
_ _ 
_ _lt
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Within neighborhoods that measure high in long term residents, and in
working class communities generally, the supply of decent, low cost
housing is infrequently available. Many units pass through word of
mouth only, and those that change hands may be offered at much higher
costs than the occupied ones. (See Chapter Four, Section III.D.) This
is especially true of the rental market. In Massachusetts, apartments
in two and three unit detached dwellings are usually considered the most
desirable because of the relative privacy and space (including porches,
walk-in pantries, private interior hallways, yards, etc.) they afford.
Vacancies in such units that are in good condition are normally extreme-
ly scarce. As households are poured into the neighborhood housing mar-
ket, which happens as soon as properties begin to be acquired by the
displacing agency, their competition for units increases effective de-
mand so that prices rise, and housing choices diminish for all communi-
ty residents. Population loss due to dislocation, directly or indirect-
ly, may deprive neighborhood businesses of established customers, or in
general deprive the neighborhood of the disposable income needed to sup-
port certain types of commercial activity (notably retailers).
3) Impacts vary for each displaced commercial activity. Businesses
with special location, service, zoning, license, or franchise restric-
tions may find the relccation to suitable replacement facilities diffi-
cult. (See Chapter Four) Those whose sales activity and volume are
highly sensitive to interruptions in operation face losses and possible
liquidation. Investment capital may not be readily available for the
costs of re-establishing in a new location, particularly for smaller
enterprises which may lack sufficient collateral to obtain loans (the
19
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Small Business Administration has proved to be little help for neighbor-
hood retailers). One of the chief impacts to displaced businesses has
been delays in the processing of their claims for reimbursement of mo-
ving expenses (the only cost of dislocation now reimburseable under Fed-
eral and State laws). Most displacing agencies require receipt of it-
emized paid bills and lengthy documentation of moving procedures prior
to their making payment. Businesses frequently acquire short term loans
at very high rates of interest in order to accomplish their move. Among
Massachusetts displacing agencies, the Department of Public Works has
proved especially insensitive to the time value of a displaced busi-
ness's money, and there are several examples of major firms having li-
quidated because their operating capital was lost on loan repayments
(there is no reimbursement of interest costs).
While some have argued that the process of dislocation merely weeds
out marginal businesses and those with weak financial structure, im-
pacts to a neighborhood due to the loss of commercial activity are more
fax reaching than equity to an individual establishment. It may be dif-
ficult or impossible to replace jobs lost in certain areas (see Chapter
Four, section III. B.). With the displacement of manufacturing es-
pecially, there may be multiplier effects that reduce volume or force
shutdown of local dependent suppliers or distributors, causing further
loss of jobs. To consumers as well as producers, change in accessibil-
ity to required goods may increase the costs of delivery and purchase.
Tax yields may be lessened to a municipality. In an area undergoing
extensive disruption because of property clearance or facility construc-
tion, there may be a negative investment psychology resulting in re-
20
duced rates. of new business entry.
Impacts to households, businesses, and neighborhoods may also be cate-
gorized by timing in the life of a project. Here again, effects differ
for certain groups. For example, the period following public hearings
and prior to acquisition of properties is one of great uncertainty to
potential relocatees and neighborhood residents as a whole. Some of
the more mobile households, those with higher incomes, and particularly
homeowners, may move during this time, even as it requires foregoing
relocation payments. "Mobility" in this sense doesn't mean transiency.
Elderly and long term occupants are frequently among the first to move
because they may want to be sure to find a replacement dwelling nearby,
and because, as their stable residency implies, they wish to avoid un-
certainty. During this time home values may become depressed because
of the rapid increase in available properties and uncertainty over ef-
fects of the project. By contrast, the rental market (in previously
stable neighborhoods) tightens and prices may rise. An explanation for
this seeming paradox is that many people are willing to remain in an un-
certain situation as tenants, while the amount of investment required
for home purchase discourages would-be owner households, particularly
those with limited resources, from taking any risk.
Project phases relate to change in land value; move-outs by type, in-
come, tenure, length of occupancy, and age of households; sales and ren-
tal market fluctuations, all of which have consequence to the social
and economic structure of a neighborhood. Unlike for households, the
uncertainty curve remains fairly constant for most businesses prior to
relocation, as many expect to lose business during or after the move
21
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(including possible liquidation) and therefore tend to remain as long
as possible (present losses count more). To my knowledge, there has
been no research to present these sorts of effects (impacts by group
through project phases) in any sort of schemata or functional model for
use in project planning. Needless to say, there are those applying such
knowledge for "speculative investment" purposes.
Further impacts due to displacement include those that accrue as a
result of the planning or implementation of remedial programs, such as
replacement housing. There may be issues such as trade-off in land
resources, problems in agency staff and organization, or legal and leg-
islative measures that attract broad participant interest, and which
may be parlayed by pro- or anti-project forces into support for the
larger decisions they advocate. These are discussed in detail in Chap-
ter Three, section III. Remedial programs need to be examined in an
open, critical planning process, but it frequently happens that the
programs become too problemmatic because of political bantering and thus
are difficult or impossible to develop at an early enough stage to as-
sure successful implementation, even as they may become serious legal
or administrative problems later on. (See Chapter Four).
A proper evaluation of impacts thus includes taking into account the
feasibility of remedial programs under present constraints, the steps
that must be taken to effect necessary changes towards implementation,
and a final evaluation of the practicability of making change in the
time allowed to complete the project. Although logically obvious, this
is a crucial point to note because such a view is seldom taken in
planning practice. It is the single most important variable dis-
tinguishing the a tica methods that__havebeen ap d. Mo
the reality of public project decision-making often warrants such con-
sideration above all else. An overriding concern of the decision-maker
is whether or not there are legal or administrative hang-ups that could
forestall project implementation. Politicians and agency officials
appear most foolish when the programs they support cannot be carried
out. To them, the real "impacts" of a project, in addition to main-
taining or gaining the support of needed constituencies, are in man-
aging the requirements of office. An analytic method that can inform,
and rationalize, decisions along these lines has far greater influence
than a mere categorization of effects on households, businesses, and
neighborhoods.
In summary, the analyst must first develop an appropriate schema
that will represent the range of effects due to displacement and their
extent of impact by project phase based on the location, design, cons-
truction, and use characttristics of a particular project (and its al-
ternatives). Secondly, the analyst must evaluate these impacts in terms
appropriate to the existing legal and administrative framework for com-
pensatory and remedial programs, developing possible new measures to
minimize harm consistent with the realities of implementation. Final-
ly, the analyst's work must show the consequences of choice among al-
ternatives (including the feasibility of implementing remedial programs)
in terms that are real to decision-makers and public participants.
The following diagrams steps in this analytical method:
14 14
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Categorize and Measure Impact -
Evaluate by Existing Compensatory Framework
Propose Measures to Minimize Harm
Develop Mechanisms for Remedial Program
Evaluate Feasibility of Implementation
(Identify non-correctable disbenefits)
Show Consequences
A problem to some analysts in working through such a methodology is
the fact that seldom, if ever, are there opportunities to exhibit the
logic of this approach in a single format. Pieces must be presented as
dictated by the context for decision-making, which will differ for
each project and which depends on the role in the process held by the
analyst. Chapters Three and Four discuss, from different perspectives,
how an identical impact assessment methodology as that described was
applied in the Boston Trasnportation Planning Review, and in the day to
day operations of the Massachusetts Dpeartment of Public Works.
One issue which the methodology we have developed thus far does not
explicitly treat is the quantification of displacement impacts in terms
susceptible to cost-benefit analysis, a common technical method of eval-
uating overall project effects (but seldom relied upon by highway and
renewal project decision-makers). Past research has not helped much in
this regard. Most social impacts have been considered outside conven-
tional project evaluations because benefits and costs were not determin-
24
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able at conventional market prices; or because barriers have existed
to the flow of funds and resources to ameliorate certain impacts; or
because certain effects, which have produced economies to some and dis-
economies to others, have been considered external to the public in-
vestment. (See Morris Hill, "Planning for Multiple Objectives: An Ap-
proach to the Evaluation of Transportation Plans," Regional Science
Research Institute, Monograph Series, Number 5, 1973). One approach
to develop measures of what are now considered "nonmarket" impacts, so
that they may be internalized in project cost-benefit evaluations, would
be to apply an assumption that the social disbenefits of a particular
project will require amelioration with other types of public invest-
ment. For example, if a highway project is expected to result in some
housing stock's requiring rehabilitation or replacement, or in in-
creased welfare or unemployment compensation in a neighborhood that
would lose jobs, or in lost private investment or tax yield, then a
dollar value could be assigned to these social impacts based on the
presumed welfare cost. Such an approach could be applied even where
public compensatory programs do not now exist by evaluating the equity
investment required to assure the status quo ante of the impacted groups.
Another way of assigning monetary values to certain effects of projects
not normally quantified would be to consider the additional costs of a
project resulting from delays in construction. Construction costs es-
calation is a major factor in overall project costs, and when compared
to the expense of providing remedial or compensatory measures that
would speed building, may show that such measures actually reduce the
overall project tab. We have used this latter techrique, an exten-
sion of the displacement impacts assessment methodology described, to
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of relocation and replacement housing
plans for the Massachusetts Department of Public Works, but it has
thus far been ignored by the Federal Highway Administration officials
in their review of proposed programs (see detailed discussion in Chap-
ter Four). Proposals for "Valuing the Nonmarket Elements of Highway
Impacts" have recently (May, 1976) been requested by the research
branch of the Federal Highway Administration (no connection to project
reviews). This is a promising line of research, but may be some time
in influencing highway project decisions.
Cost-benefit analyses need different frames of reference in order to
specify impacts in terms appropriate to the various affected groups.
For example, an objective function could be to analyze impacted neigh-
borhood services by comparing inflows and outflows to the neighborhood
economy. If population were projected to be lost or gained within the
neighborhood as a consequence of project. implementation, the analysis
would show change in disposable income to have particular consequences
for local businesses and prospects for growth and new investment in
the neighborhood. This type of impact is masked in a more aggre-
gate analysis, but is crucial to understanding cohesion and disruption
as experienced by local residents. Similarly, an analysis of impacts
from the perspective of displaced households and businesses yields a
very different valuation for project effects than the conventional com-
parison of, in highway projects, user travel time savings against con-
struction, maintenance, acquisition and compensable relocation costs.
The fact that techniques for cost-benefit appraisals of public pro-
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jects have been so inflexible in the past, leaving many of the signifi-
cant social impacts as externalities, underscores the problem facing
analysts who would see impacts due to displacement more effectively
managed. Political motivations are more transparent.. Except where
their interests may be expressed through class action litigation (see
Chapter Two), relocatees are generally unorganized, and therefore fail
to promote their concerns as effectively as environmental, construction,
or other advocates (see Chapter Three). The problem thus falls heavily
on the technician or planner to assure that impacts due to displacement
receive balanced weight in decision-making.
III. Change and the Power of Public Agencies
Prior to the Boston Transportation Planning Review (1970-1972), re-
location planning was not performed by the Department of Public Works,
an agency which has accounted for over sixty per cent of displacements
in Massachusetts. Highway engineers described displacement solely in
terms of estimated acquisition and relocation payment costs, without
regard for the types of households, businesses, or neighborhoods affec-
ted. Their choices of .route locatior and design caused far more impact
to households, businesses, and the social and economic structure of
neighborhoods than would have seemed prudent, even then. In renewal
planning as well, no"relocation plans" ever showed housing or commercial
market resources to be deficient, though the experience of relocation
programs proved far different - conclusions would have been warranted.
This in spite of the fact that, throughout the history of the Inter-
state Highway Program, and since the Housing (Urban Renewal) Act of
1949, federal agencies have been required to review the proposed dis-
___________ if-
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placements of state agencies to assure "sufficient suitable resources"
would be available for relocation.
Displaced households and businesses have not been the only victims
of the irresponsible planning and implementation of relocation programs.
Costs in public funds have been far greater to projects delayed by
shortages in housing and business resources, as lead times to construc-
tion drag on. The overwhelmingly bad image that has accumulated
throughout highway and renewal project history now means that attempts
to carry out beneficial and needed projects meet greater resistence
than may be warranted. M'any extraordinarily disruptive and unbuildable
projects have been carried on the docket of highway and renewal agen-
cies for years, and still are today. The result is a further waste of
public funds in agency expenditures, as well as foregone efforts on
other projects.
The remainder of this thesis is about attempts to improve the prac-
tices of public agencies in their planning and implementation of re-
location programs, and in their overall decision-making about projects.
The dynamic has been a complex one, overly complex for effective sum-
mary in this chapter. One hopes that some change for the better 'has
been made on behalf of relocatees. However, the present state of re-
location in Massachusetts suggests that the lessons of the past, how-
ever dramatic, and the possibilities for improvement provoked by the
Boston Transportation Planning Review and established (over three
years, at least) in subsequent agency practice, have 4iot been enough
to assure the continuous improvement of relocation programs. The
last major relocation plan prepared by this author and staff of the
Relocation Planning Section, Department of Public Works, was altered by
the Right of Way Bureau Director to show non-existent housing resources,
and submitted to the Federal Highway Administration. There was no docu-
mentation to support his changes. Implications were that certain
households would be deprived of adequate relocation assistance. Last
Resort Replacement Housing, proved necessary in the original analysis,
was eliminated as a requirement of the plan. Attempts were made to
counter these misstatements by contact with the Commissioner of Public
Works, the Secretary of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration
officials and the state Bureau of Relocation. No correction resulted.
The project at the time was a high priority of the incumbent adminis-
tration about to face elections.
- 4
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THE WORKING CLASS NEIGHBORHOOD
While the definition of a "working class" household and community
has differed among various authors, the following objective charac-
teristics are most frequently cited as distinguishing working class
persons from the larger proportion of society (the so called middle
class): lower income; blue collar occupation; lower average level
of school years completed; greater proportion of social interaction
devoted to persons who live physically nearby. On the latter point
most researchers have found a relatively high proportion of relatives
concentrated in working class communities, and that these extended
kin networks and the neighborhood social milieu overall are much more
important to working class households (over a range of ethnicities)
than for middle class families. In a review of a substantial body of
the literature, one author summarizes as follows:
"The longstandingness of the 'traditional' working class
communities and the physical proximity of kin and neigh-
bors within them, it is claimed, have combined to Produce
an intermeshing of social bonds which give formidable power
to the social controls of community life, and these inturn,
have served to strengthen and conserve the norms and val-
ues of 'traditional' working class life... (In contrast,
middle class communities) tend to lack these kinship bonds
and therefore have developed a more 'home-centered' pat-
tern of life focused upon the nuclear family, in which the
material affluence of the home is an object of greater con-
cern. Associated with this material affluence has been
noted a more individualistic form of status seeking which
contrasts with the attitudes towards relations with other
people to be found in the (working class) areas."1
A number of authors have measured the frequency of emotional and
instrumental ties with relatives in working class communities. In
1. D.M. Toomey "The Importance of Social Networks in Working Class
Areas" Urban Studies 7. 3., Oct. 1970.
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one such study, Sussman noted that 70 percent of working class subjects
compared with 45 percent of middle class subjects had relatives living
in their neighborhood. Ninety-two percent of those with relatives
nearby were assisted by them during illness and other crises.2
Adams 3 determined that contact between relatives is influenced by
social class position. Social and geographical mobility are crucial-
ly important determinates of the extensiveness of kin ties, according
to Adams, and changes in social or geographic positions weaken exist-
ing patterns of relationships with relatives. Adams implies that ties
with relatives are based upon their potential for equal exchange.
Changes in social or geographic position weaken contacts because of
inabilities to offer help and satisfy requests. Fulfillment of prior
obligations becomes delayed and less immediately rewarding.
Patterns of social contacts between nearby friends and neighbors,
as well as relatives, have been found by a number of researchers to
be important linkages between working class households. Boston's
West End revealed the tight social network characteristic of cohesive
lower class communities. Fried and Gleicher 4 found that 75 percent
of their respondents liked the area and only 10 percent did not. De-
spite the apparent physical deterioration and congestion most impres-
2. Sussman, M.E. "The Isolated Nuclear Family: fact or fiction" Social
Problems 6 (Spring, 1959).
3. Adams, B.N. Kinship in an Urban Setting Chicago, Markham, 1968.
4. Fried, M.; Gleicher, P. "Some Sources of Residential Satisfaction
in an Urban Slum" Journal of the American Institute of Planners 27
Nov., 1961.
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sive to outsiders, identification with and attachment to the area was
"all-pervasive" for most West End residents. The strength of the so-
cial relationships within the area is shown by the finding that 60 per-
cent of respondents reported that 5 relatives and 5 friends they felt
closest to all resided within the West End. Given the strong social
structure, residents overlooked the disreputable physical features. Ac-
cording to these researchers, the proximity of important social rela-
tionships transformed the West End into a world almost complete in it-
self. "The density of the networks of social ties within a fixed space
made the area unusually cohesive and socially rewarding."
In a classic study of that same community, Gans 5 suggested that the
West End's Urban Renewal Relocation Program was ineffective because...
"... it was developed by middle class professionals assuming self suf-
ficiency of the nuclear family... (whereas) many of the physically in-
dividual households are tied to those of their extended families (and
neighbors) by strong bonds..." In fact, the overwhelming evidence from
numerous studies of relocation programs carried out in working class
communities is that the social environment is most responsible for post-
move dissatisfaction and loneliness. Another example is the study by
Morris and Mogey6 of the consequences of relocating a number of house-
holds from different areas into a new English housing estate:
"Physical housing was the same for all, yet there were defi-
nite variations in satisfaction after relocation. Within
5. Gans, H.J. "The Human Implications of Current Redevelopment and Re-
location Planning" Journal of the American Institute of Planners 25,
Feb., 1959.
6. Morris, R.N.; Mogey, J.M. The Sociology of Housing London Routledge
and Kegan Paul Ltd. 1965.
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neighborhood groupings, households expressed the same level of
satisfaction; between neighborhood groupings, there were dif-
ferences in levels of satisfaction. The neighborhood group
subjectively defined the adequacy of rehousing situations.
Neighbors were a powerful source of social definition; they
generated attitudes and definitions of reality for the com-
ponent households."
Rainwater 7 reports that social class position influences the meaning
of housing. The lower (income) class person views his home and neigh-
borhood as a place of security providing basic needs of shelter and
protection. The house and its environs fulfills an essential service,
and any threat to that security (real or imagined) impinges on house-
holds' perceived control over social forces. Rainwater suggests, by
contrast, that the middle class- household is less upset by stress such
as relocation since the house is seen more as a repository of success
symbols which are readily transported and re-assembled.
______________ II _______________
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7. Rainwater, L. "Fear and house-as-haven in the Lower Class" Journal
of the American Institute of Planners 32 Jan., 1966.
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FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THE COURTS: THE PROBLEM OF LITIGATION
ON BEHALF OF RELOCATEES
Introduction
An estimated 100,000 persons annually are displaced from their homes
as a result of federal or federally aided programs. The urban renewal
program, which accounts for only about one-third of all governmental
displacements, is reputed to have uprooted 4 million families since its
inception in 1949, while the Interstate Highway Program displaced over
1 million families in urban areas during the 1960's alone. The
relocation of families thus ranks among the nation's -most important
2
housing problems.
The principle difficulty faced by displaced households is securing
adequate replacement housing at affordable prices. Interpretation of
what constitutes adequate replacement housing, affordable prices, as
well as the process by which agencies determine the availability of
housing and relocate families, has been the subject of an extensive body
of complex litigation, particularly over the past seven years. The
primary reference for recent relocation litigation has been provisions
of the Federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (commonly referred to as the Uniform
Relocation Act, herein the URA). This comprehensive legislation was
passed by Congress as Senate Bill 1 (sponsored by Edmund Muskie, the
1. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Regulations, Relocation:
Unequal Treatment of People and Businesses Displaced by
Governments 10-11 (1965)
2. The Interest in Rootedness: Family Relocation and Approach to
Full Indemnity, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 801, 802 n. 7 (1969)
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then Vice Presidential candidate), after 9 years of debate and thousands
of pages of testimony from agency officials, community, labor, and
business interest groups, as well as experienced and potential litigants.
The purpose of this portion of the thesis will be to review the court's
role in interpreting certain provisions of the URA and agency regulations
promulgated in furtherance of the statute, which are relevant to the
issues of adequate, affordable replacement housing. The final part of
this section will suggest strategies for future litigation based upon
the judicial doctrines observed to have developed thus far. Some
discussion of cases prior to the URA will also be undertaken, particu-
larly as the cases relate to questions of standing, timing, and scope
of judicial review.
Background
Chief among the issues debated on relocation law and administrative
regulations is what constitutes adequate replacement housing. The
Uniform Relocation Act requires that there be available, "within a
reasonable time prior to displacement", dwellings for relocation
that are:
"...in areas not generally less desirable in regard to
public utilities and public and commercial facilities and
prices within the financial means of the families and
individuals displaced, decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings,
as defined by such federal agency head, equal in number to
the number of and available to such displaced persons who
require such dwellings and reasonably accessible to their
places of employment..." (sec. 205 (c) (3))
The Act also requires that "comparable replacement sale or rental
housing" be available for each household prior to relocation, and
that, if necessary, such housing is to be provided through the use of
project funds. (Sec. 206 (a)) The term "comparable replacement housing"
is not further defined in the statute.
Each Federal Agency has promulgated regulations (as called for in
the statute) that provide detailed guidelines (primarily aimed at
state implementing agencies, such as highway and renewal authorities)
for carrying out the Uniform Relocation Act. In the case of federally-
aided programs, compliance to the regulations is required by state
authorities before the federal agency will approve certain segments of
a project or provide reimbursement.
Federal Highway Administration regulations3 state that "within a
reasonable period of time prior to displacement comparable replacement
dwellings will be available or provided (built if necessary) for each
displaced person." (ppm 81-1; par. 7. b. (1)) The regulations define
a comparable replacement dwelling as one which is:
"(1) Decent, safe, and sanitary...(as defined elsewhere in
the regulations. Where local codes are different from the
specified standards, the more stringent applies)
(2) Functionally equivalent and substantially the same as the
acquired dwelling with respect to: (a) number of rooms.
(b) area of living space. (c) type of construction. (d) age.
(e) state of repair.
(3) Fair housing is open to all persons regardless of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin and consistent with
the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619 and 3631.
(4) In areas not generally less desirable than the acquired
dwelling in regard to: (a) public utilities. (b) public
and commercial services and facilities.
(5) Reasonably accessible to the relocatees place of
employment.
3. Federal Highway Administration Regulations are selected for
discussion. The regulations of other federal agencies are substantially
similar, although FHWA has gone farther in detailing aspects of
"comparable replacement dwellings"
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(6) Adequate to accommodate the relocatee.
(7) In an equal or better neighborhood.
(8) Available on the market to the displaced person.
(9) Within the financial means of the displaced family
or individual."
(PPM 81-1, par. 4g)
Some of these technical points are the subject of furious debate on
interpretalon, within state agencies, between the states and the
Federal agency, as well as in litigation. Before turning to the form
this debate has taken in the courts, it will be useful to give some
examples of discussion that takes place in the day to day operation of
the relocation programs, and the consequences different interpretations
have had for displaced households.
There are no criteria in Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
regulations for determining what families can afford to pay for
replacement housing, although housing "within financial means" is an
explicit guarantee of both the Uniform Relocation Act (URA) and the
regulations. For years, HUD has used in its relocation programs the
standard that gross housing costs are not to exceed 25 percent of gross
family income. Some argue that this is a questionable guideline when
applied to large families of low income, and overall when considering
that the average American family pays less than 15 percent of its
income for housing.4 On the other hand, highway otticials have resisted
this or any other general standard, arguing that the realities of
4. US Census Reports, 1970. Comparison is made between gross income
and gross housing costs (heat, electricity, etc.). The mean for
households with incomes below $5,000 per year, however, is over 35%.
i *
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housing supply require that lower income families spend a higher
proportion of their income for housing, and that in any case, affordable
housing expense must be determined on an individual basis.5 Indeed,
the experience of relocation programs has been that most families
spend considerably more for the replacement dwelling than they had
spent prior to relocation.6
Higher costs for housing and other necessary services is the most
frequently cited cause of relocation hardship, and the most obvious
burden public actions have placed upon displaced households. As a
measure of relief, the Uniform Act provided that up to $4,000 could be
paid to displaced tenants to cover increased housing costs, and up to
$15,000 to homeowners over and above payment of fair market value for
the acquired dwelling. A very serious concern Is whether these
"replacement housing payments" are to be considered an income
supplement in determining financial means. The problem is most acute
for elderly, low income homeowners, who frequently find that the
5. There are no cases of which I am familiar, or to which FHWA has
referred, in which families have been determined to be able to afford
less than 25 percent. The tangible result of FHWA policy is that
lower income households, especially the elderly, spend more (in
some cases over 60 per cent of income) for replacement housing.
6. Hartman, "Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief", 57 Va. L. %v.
No. 5 (1971). Hartman provides a comparison of studies in several
states (p. 781f). Also, John Mogey et. al Social Effects of Eminent
Domain, Mass DPW, 1972. Mogey notes that families displaced for Boston's
Southwest Expressway paid, on the average, 28 per cent of income for
housing after moving, compared to 21 per cent before. Median rents
rose from $106 per month pre-relocation to $143 per month post
relocation. Fifty-five per cent of households spent more than 25
per cent of their income for replacement accommodations.
7. Hartman, op. cit.
II ________
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increased taxes on a higher valued home (the up to $15,000 is provided
as the difference between the purchase price of a replacement dwelling
and the FMV acquisition price) are unaffordable on a limited, fixed
budget. Similarly, low income tenants who must use the replacement
housing payment to achieve financial means are left with apartments
costing more than they can afford once the payment runs out, and must
then undertake a second move to cheaper quarters.8 This latter
circumstance can be seen to defeat many of the objectives of a
relocation assistance program, as households may revert to slum housing
and must make the second move without reimbursement for moving costs.
An alternative interpretation is that the replacement housing
payments should not be considered an income supplement, and that
determinations of financial means should reflect the real and permanent
costs of a replacement dwelling. Justification for this view is that
the payments were meant to compensate displaced homeowners and tenants
for the loss of favorable housing cost situations, imposed by a public
action which reduces the low cost housing supply and forces higher
costs for remaining dwellings by increasing effective demand. If
adopted, this interpretation would mean that displacing agencies replace,
through new construction or long-term rental subsidies, more of the low
cost housing supply than is now their practice. The overwhelming body
of congressional testimony for passage of the Uniform Act seems to
8. Consider the not untypical case of a family that can afford less
than $100 per month, based on the 25 per cent of income standard. The
supplemental payment could add up to $85 per month to their "Affordable"
housing expense, more than doubling the rent to income ratio after the
payment runs out (the statute specifies the payment to be computed
over a 4 year period).
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warrant such consequence as the legislative intent. 9
Locational criteria for replacement dwellings are another set of
statutory and regulatory provisions subject to important differences
in interpretation. For example, does the requirement that replacement
dwellings be "...in areas not generally less desirable... in regard
to public utilities, public and commercial facilities" mean that
shopping, medical, and other services be as handy to the relocatee in
the replacement home as they were prior to relocation? Within walking
distance of the new home if such was the case prior to displacement?
If public transportation was available prior to relocation, must it
also be available if needed in post-relocation housing? How far is
"reasonably accessible to place of employment" - twenty miles? Two
miles? A commute equivalent to that required before relocation?
Does the requirement that replacement dwellings be "adequate to
accommodate the relocatee" mean that families must be allowed to
relocate in the same neighborhood, or the same community? Should such
choice be a "right" of 'the relocatee, or should it be a parameter of
the relocation program only under specified circumstances? For example,
would a necessary condition of adequate relocation include keeping
children in the same school system if the family, or school officials
(or other public and private authorities like psychiatrists or
physicians) consider that remaining in the same school system is
endemic to a child's well being? Would replacement housing be
9. See, for example, Hearings Before the Committee on Public
Works, House of Representatives Dec. 2,4, 1969; Feb 18,19,25;
Mar. 3,4,5,10,11,12,17,18,19 1970 (1118 pages)
Ii ________
"adequate to accommodate the ielocatee" if long-term residents,
particularly the elderly, are required to leave a neighborhood and
break established relationships, at the cost of severe disorientation
and possible psychological or physical trauma? 1 0
As any relocation worker will attest, such problems are the day to
day substance of relocation programs. While agencies may, in theory,
be disposed towards a resolve favorable to relocatees, there are many
many instances where choices and services important to the displaced
household, and seemingly granted in the legislation or regulations,
are not provided. And such failure cannot always be related to what the
displacing agencies, or the general public, may regard as an overriding
concern to implement the renewal or highway improvements. Lacking more
explicit standards for performance, the implementing agencies are often
arbitrary and capricious in their carrying out of relocation programs,
changing and substituting interpretations of their own regulations that
are expedient or defensive of the case at hand. 1 1
A final set of controversies, which need to be introduced as back-
ground to discussion of court actions, focus on the notions of
"comparable dwellings" and "equal or better" neighborhoods. (see page
4 display of regulatory provisions) These requirements are among
those most hotly debated by agency officials and community advocates,
10. There are many examples of just such problems documented in the
literature. See especially Ellen Fitzgerald at al. "Mental Health
Services During the Relocation Crisis", NIMH Grant No. m h 15086-03
(unpublished)
11. Review of FHWA audits of their own Regional and Area offices
performance, and of state agencies, are most .revealing. Some examples
are discussed in Chapter Four.
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because they are specially subceptible to evaluation during the planning
stages of a project, and can be seen to effect build/no-build project
decisions. For example, FHWA regulations require that replacement
dwellings be comparable to the acquired homes with respect to "area of
living space" and "type of construction". Does this mean that tenant
families living in one, two, or three unit detached dwellings cannot
12
be required to move to high-rise apartments? One can easily imagine
instances where such interpretation, applied in a congested urban area,
might make a large scale relocation program infeasible. Similarly,
with regard to the "equal or better neighborhood" provision, one can
ask for example whether low income families living in tightly-knit,
stable neighborhoods, should be required to accept accommodations in
public housing located in a high crime area, or experiencing high
turnover or abandonement?1 3 If a family were accustomed to, and
12. The Governor of Massachusetts said no in dismissing the Inner Belt
through Cambridge-Somerville, arguing that a humane relocation program
meeting federal relocation requirements was not possible. The road
would have displaced 1700 families, almost all occupants of 2-3 family
houses. With almost nothing available through vacancies in existing
private and publicly-assisted housing in the two communities, and very
little vacant land, replacement housing would have had to be built on
air rights over the highway. That solution was dismissed for several
reasons, including that construction of comparable structures would be
costly and dangerous (due to fumes). Neighborhood disruption was a
critical concern as well. (See also Chapter Three discussion of the
Boston Transportation Planning Review.)
13. In the Southwest Expressway program (Mogey, op.cit.), although
49 per cent of households were initially determined eligible for
public housing, only 9 per cent expressed preference for relocating
to public housing. Only 15 per cent of all households eventually
accepted accommodations in public or publicly-assisted housing, and
of these 73 per cent moved into leased units in new 221 (d)(3)
projects. It is frequently reported, and confirmed by these figures
that few displaced families with any viable alternative would choose
the conventional public housing available to them (continued next page)
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perhaps dependent upon, having relatives and friends nearby, would
displacement to far off or unfamiliar surroundings qualify as being
"in an equal or better neighborhood" for that family?14 Are rural
households expected to move from their ten acre homes to one-quarter
15
acre lots in a suburban subdivision?
Debate on the statutory and regulatory provisions discussed in this
brief background is heated because the interpretations determine
whether or not replacement housing must be built to the needs of
displaced households. Examples where whole projects might be declared
infeasible, because of interpretations granting remedy to the relocatees,
are extremely rare, and in highway cases appear only in projects which
tend to show a plethora of additional negative environmental and social
13. continued: in Boston. The Boston Housing Authority has a long
standing policy to grant relocatees admittance only to projects with
the greatest number of vacancies - by definition, the worst neighbor-
hoods. See also Chapter Three.
14. Dependancy is not the only measure of a neighborhood's impor-
tance. A certain neighborhood may simply be a "very good place to live",
because it is well-serviced, convenient, safe, hospitable, diverse,
providing inexpensive housing, or whatever. Judgments are also
reflecting of household characteristics, such as age and number of
children, sex of household head, etc. Some relocatees place a premium
on particular neighborhood qualities, others are satisfied to move to
any of several neighborhoods. However, disruption of extended kinship,
as well as less formal ties to a familiar and desired area, is consis-
tently shown to be among the worst burdens of relocation programs. (See
Hartman; Mogey; Fitzgerald op.cit. and Chapter Four.
15. This precise concern was voiced in a recent public Meeting on
pending new highway alternatives in Gill, Massachusetts. Potential
relocatees were most fearful of losing land that could not be replaced.
Most of the land in the community is not developed, is not farmed, but
it is also not available for purchase because residents prize it as it
is. Taxes are low, and some holdings go back several generations. Most
of the affected families have very modest incomes, so that purchase in
more expensive areas would be infeasible.
45
impacts all of which mitigate heavily against construction of the road.16
The real problem is agency reluctance to undertake replacement housing
programs, and their propensity to consider relocation an unfortunate,
essentially unrectifiable, by-product of an otherwise beneficial public
action. Study of the agencies' systemic characteristics, particularly
reward structures and functional organizations, would support this
assertion (See Chapter Four) as does the discussion of litigation
which follows. It would seem that the agencies have yet to accept the
strong policy declaration of Congress in the Uniform Act that
"(displaced) persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a
result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole",
while the courts, reluctantly involved in complex administrative matters,
struggle for a proper role in the face of the overwhelmingly bad
performance of many public relocation programs.
Relevant Court Actions: Developing Doctrines for Judicial Review
There are several cases key to the future of litigation based on
relocation law and administrative regulations. They set precedents
for standing to sue and timing of judicial review of administrative
action, the extent to which the courts may be involved in interpre-
tation of administrative requirements, and the extent to which the
court may require and enforce action to comply with its rulings on
statutory and regulatory requirements.
Prior to the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1968, highway displacees
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16. See R. Gakenheimer, Transportation Planning as Response to
Controversy: The Boston Case.
were considered to have no legal right to dispute state and federal
agency action. Although neither the 1968 Highway Act nor its
successor, the Uniform Relocation Act of 1970, contain provisions for
judicial review, since their passage Federal courts have consistently
found that plaintiff displacees have standing to question administrative
action. 17
In Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie (314 F. Supp. 20
(S.D.W. Va. 1969)) the court held that the proper test for standing is
to determine at the outset whether the statute precludes judicial
review. If not, said the court, then p. 702 of the Administrative
Procedure Act provides that any person "aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof". (5 U.S.C. par. 702 (1970) The court noted in
Triangle, "... the relevant statute involved here, which is the
Federal Highway Act of 1968 (now embodied in the Uniform Relocation
Act of 1970), particularly the relocation assistance provisions contained
therein, clearly was intended to protect persons such as the plaintiffs
in this matter." (314 F. Supp. at 27)
A critical question is when in the highway project process relocatees
are allowed to question the action of administering agencies. Clearly,
if persons are already displaced, and especially if work is already
underway on construction, then the courts remedies would have damages
to undo rather than prevent, and their actions might involve other
17. Roberts, "Homes, Roadbuilders and the Courts: Highway Relocation
and Judicial Review of Administrative Action" 46 S. Cal. L. Rev.
Dec. 1972
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interests that had matured to a point where conflicting hardships would
need to be weighed. 18 The courts have thus been reluctant to get
involved late in the process. In Concerned Citizens for the Preservation
of Clarksville v. Volpe, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Texas noted:
"Many factors, including existing contractual committments,
work completed, the extreme difficulty or impossibility of
now relocating the right of way or altering the design, the
public's need for rapid and safe transportation, as well as
the impossibility of returning the appellants to the status
quo ante even if a hearing were ordered, all mitigate heavily
against the intervention of equity, if it were warranted at
an earlier stage in the project." (445 F. 2d. 485
(5th Cir. 1971))
Contrasting its involvement in relocation ex post, in recent cases
the courts have acted decisively to protect the rights of relocatees
during the planning process.19 In La Raza Unida v. Volpe (337 F. Supp.
221 (N.D. Cal. 1971)), the U.S. District Court of California issued
a preliminary injunction restraining the State from acquiring property
for the highway and restraining the Federal government from granting
project approvals or providing funds until a satisfactory relocation
program was devised. Plaintiffs had shown that if the project continued,
harm to the relocatees would be irreparable due to the State's inadequate
relocation program and failure to comply with federal relocation
18. Roberts, op. cit.
19. For relocation, the most important points in the highway planning
process are as follows: location approval, in which the preferred
route is selected; design approval, following which acquisition and
relocation may begin; and final design or construction approval,
which can be granted only after all relocation and right of way
clearance (meeting federal standards) is complete. (See Chapter
Four)
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standards and regulations.20 The court was Impressed by the strong
policy statements of both the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1968 and
the Uniform Relocation Act, and commented on Congress' concern with the
problems of highway displacement: "The main thrust and purpose of the
1968 and 1970 Acts was to protect the displaced persons even before
construction." (337 F. Supp. at 229)
In Lathan v. Volpe (445 F. 2d. 1111 (9th. Cir. 1971)) 'the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeal in Washington reversed a district court's
denial of injunctive relief for displacees of 1-190 in Seattle, and
ordered the State to implement a proper relocation program before doing
any further work on the highway. In this case, formal acquisition had
not begun, although a number of properties had been bought, at owners'
request, under provisions for advance taking due to hardship. In
requiring the State to comply with federal relocation requirements, the
court made two important findings:
"This is one of those comparatively rare cases in which,
unless the plaintiffs receive now whatever relief they are
entitled to, there is danger that it will be of little or no
value to them when finally obtained." (Id. at 1117)
"If the purpose of the statute is to be accomplished, it must
be fully implemented not later than the approval of the
corridor or route of the highway...At that point, all the
pressure leading to displacement comes into play. Unless
the State is then in a position to give the statutory
20. The state highway agency claimed to be exempt from Federal
relocation requirements because federal monies had not yet been
expended on the project (although federal-aid programming had been
received and location approval sought and granted). The court felt
otherwise: "By their very wording, the statutes and regulations in
question seem to apply to federal aid projects before money has
been appropriated and as early as location approval." (337 F. Supp.
at 233)
ii if
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assurances as defined by the Secretary, there is danger
that displacements will proceed without anyone's knowing
whether the requirements of the statute can be fully met."
(Id. at 1119)
These comments were crucial cites in cases following Lathan
(particularly Keith v. Volpe, discussed below), and have obvious
implications for relocation planning.21
Given standing to sue, and opportunity to bring a case to court prior
to property acquisition or relocation (and/or prior to its being
completed), the principle issue for relocatees in litigation involves
the scope of judicial review. How far will the courts go in interpreting
administrative standards, and to what detail will remedies be prescribed?
The early cases involving judicial analysis of administrative perfor-
mance bore mixed results for the relocatees claims, and were character-
ized by the court's ambivalence in substituting its judgment for that
expressed by agency officials.
"Many of these cases seem to be based on the premise that
the administrative agency possesses so much expertise that
a court cannot hope even to analyze the facts, much less
order means of compliance. The argument seems to be that,
even if the rights of the people involved are disregarded,
the courts should not serve as administrators because they
lack necessary skills." 2 2
In Clarksville v. Volpe (op. cit.), for example, a district court
was faced with a situation where indigent blacks were being displaced
by an urban freeway near Austin, Texas. The State had submitted
assurances that relocation housing would be available, pursuant to
21. Unless the state highway agency performs adequate relocation
planning in the first instance, plaintiffs may question the right
of a highway to proceed.
22. Roberts, op. cit. p. 67
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the federal regulation, but had not documented the actual ntumber of
available units nor correllated available supply with the actual numbers
and needs of the displacees, as required in the regulations. In effect,
the State had declared its compliance with the relocation statute and
regulations without submitting any data to support its declaration.
The plaintiff displacees sought to enjoin the process until documentation
was provided. The district court granted the highway department
summary judgment. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, almost a year after
the district court decision, was faced with a fait accompli - there
were no displacees left to protect. The appellate court could only
dismiss the action (see cite p. 11). In so doing, however, it noted
"that there must come a point in time when even the most grievous
wrong is sadly beyond the power of equity to rectify." (445 F. 2d.
at 495)
Courts followed a similar restraint in deciding the extent of
judicial review of relocatees' rights in the early urban renewal
litigation. In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Authority
(395 F. 2d. 920 (2d. Cir. 1968)), litigated under section 105 (c) of
the National Housing Act prior to passage of the URA, it was stated:
"...courts will evaluate agency efforts and success at
relocation with a realistic awareness of the problems
facing urban renewal programs. Objections by individual
displacees based on ... too literal an interpretation of
the Act's standards could unnecessarily interfere with
programs of benefit to the entire community."
However, it should be noted that the Norwalk court's caution was
limited only to plaintiff relocatees claims that would question the
overall urban renewal project, and indeed showed none of the
deference to administrative action implicit in the Clarksville
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district court decision. The Norwalk court believed that Congress had
made clear in section 105 (c) of the National Housing Act of 1968 a view
that adequate relocation was also in the public interest, holding that
the court may review the "...possibility that an administrative agency,
charged with enforcing a requirement established by Congress in the
public interest, will not adequately perform the task." The Norwalk
case was also significant in that the court allowed plaintiff Negro
and Puerto Rican displacees to claim denial of equal protection in
violation of the fourteenth amendment:
"Where the relocation standard set by Congress is met for those
who have access to any housing in the community which they
can afford, but not for those who by reason of their race
are denied free access to housing they can afford and must
pay more for what they can get, the State action affirms
the discrimination in the housing market. This is not
'equal protection of the law'."
Western Addition Community Organization (WACO) v. Weaver (294 F. Supp.
433 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1968)) was the first case in which a court
enjoined an entire urban renewal project and halted further displace-
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ment. The WACO court found it proper to review the adequacy of a
relocation plan, and framed its inquiry as follows:
"...whether (the agency HUD's) determination of satisfactori-
ness has such a basis in fact as to make it a legally
supportable exercise of the discretion vested in the Secre-
tary or whether, as contended by plaintiff, his ...
determination of 'satisfactoriness' has been made without
any basis in fact as to be unreasonable as an exercise of
the Secretary's discretion or as a compliance with the
statute." (294 F. Supp. at 437)
In characterizing the relief it had granted, based on its finding
that the initial relocation plan was inadequate, the court defined a
narrow role for itself, allowing the Secretary (HUD) broad
23. Roberts, op. cit. p. 67
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discretion for his ultimate determination of satisfactoriness.
"This injunction relief does not mean that this court is
presumtuously attempting to administer the complexities of
urban development. That is not the function of the court
nor is the court administratively equipped to do so. Nor
does it mean that this court is attempting to substitute
its judgment for that of the Secretary concerning the
'satisfactoriness' of the local agency's relocation plan.
Our decision simply means that the court can and should
see to it that the Secretary complies with the requirements
of the federal statute, and his own regulations, not merely
in form but in substance, and that the administrative
discretion vested in him by law is not arbitrarily abused,
as in this case, but is reasonably exercised with some
substantial basis in fact to support it. Such is the
traditional function of the court upon review of admin-
istrative action of the kind here involved." (Id. at 441)
Thereafter, the Secretary reviewed and approved a relocation plan
for the project, and, in its subsequent decision to dissolve the
injunction despite plaintiffs' objections that the plan was still
inadequate, the WACO court reiterated its limited role:
"Since the statute vests the function and responsibility
squarely upon the Secretary, the judicial function is
narrowly limited to ascertaining whether the Secretary
has made the determination required of him by law, and if
so, whether he has acted in apparent good faith, reasonably
rather than arbitrarily and with some factual basis for his
decision. If so, judicial review can go no further. The
court may not, and should not, substitute its judgment for
that of the Secretary - even if the court might believe that
the Secretary could have made a different decision con-
cerning the satisfactoriness of the local agency's relocation
plan and assurances." (WACO v. Romney, 320 F. Supp. 308,
312.(1969))
More than one legal scholar has looked with dismay on contradictions
apparent in the WACO decisions. LaFrance et. al. (Law of the Poor)
note (p. 195) that "... the court overlooked (in WACO v. Romney) its
insight in WACO v. Weaver, namely that weight must be given to the
legitimate claims of those the statute was designed to protect."
Ii 1:1
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While accepting a concept of limited judicial review similar to
WACO v. Romney, the court in Tenants and Owners in Opposition to
Redevelopment (TOOR) v. HUD (No. C-69 324 (N.D. Cal. April 30, 1970))
probed considerably more deeply into the substance of agency regu-
lations. Judge Weigel of the Northern District of California
enjoined the $385 million Yerba Buena Center Redevelopment Project for
failing to provide adequate relocation arrangements for persons to be
displaced from the project area. Plaintiffs major contention was that
the relocation plan approved by the Secretary of HUD failed to meet the
requirements of section 105 (c) (1) & (2) and that, therefore, federal
24
financing of the project violated the National Housing Act. The court
held plaintiffs entitled to review and set the scope of its inquiry as
follows:
"The statute commits substantial powers of complex decision
making to an executive department which is or should be
staffed by highly trained personnel. Because of this and
based on the reasoning in WACO, the court concludes that
judicial review is limited to the legal question of whether
or not there was any basis in fact for the Secretary's
decisions. However, the fact that judicial review is limited
cannot absolve this court from the duty of thorough examination
of the record. (emphasis added) (Id. at 12)
The court ruled that the approval of relocation plans is not a decision
committed to agency discretion and exempted from judicial scrutiny, and,
in further deliniating its proper standard for review, said:
24. Plaintiffs four other claims were (1) "that they have been denied
due process of law because they were not accorded adequate hearings
prior to approval of the redevelopment and relocation plans"; (2)
"that the project denies them equal protection of the laws"; (3) "that
defendants violated the HUD regulation requiring consultation with
minority groups"; (4) "that the redevelopment plan includes a luxury
hotel in violation of 42 U.S.C. par. 1546 (g)" (TOOR v. HUD
324 N.D. Cal. 1970)
55
"This court concludes that the court in WACO consistently
limited review to a determination of "arbitrariness". The
phrase "substantial basis in fact" in the first WACO opinion
means only that a court should fully explore the record on
the question of arbitrariness. It does not mean that a
court should overturn a non-arbitrary decision by the
Secretary because, in the court's view, the decision was
not supported by substantial evidence." (Id. at 12)
Regarding the criteria by which relocation plans were to be judged,
the court elaborated the provisions of the statute:
"The substantive requirements of par. 1455 (c)(1) can be
divided into two parts. First, the statute requires that
there be relocation dwellings 'equal in number to the
number of and available to such displaced individuals and
families...' In other words, there have to be at least
as many available vacant dwellings as the number of
dwellings to be destroyed by the redevelopment. Second,
these dwellings have to meet certain standards: (a) they
must be 'not generally less desirable in regard to public
utilities and public and commercial facilities... and
reasonably accessible to their places of employment';
(b) they have to be at rents and prices within the financial
means of the individuals and families displaced'; and (c)
they have to be 'decent, safe, and sanitaryt". (Id. at 15)
Plaintiffs' claims were examined by the court in light of these
criteria. A preliminary injunction was issued when the court found
that "there are serious questions concerning the validity of the
Agency's calculations of existing vacancies available for Yerba Buena
residents". In making this finding the court relied on HUD regulations
prohibiting the use -of turnover estimates. (see discussion in Keith v.
Volpe, below) The court also found that the relocation plan failed to
show that housing would be available within the financial means of
relocatees, and that there was no evidence to indicate that the relo-
cation housing would be decent, safe, and sanitary.
The court in TOOR thus exceeded the limited scope of the second
WACO review, in practice if not in theory, by careful examination
U t4
of the evidence and insistence that HUD observe statutory and regulatory
requirements. In relating its findings to the explicit existing agency
and legislative standards, the TOOR court could maintain that it had
not, in fact, substituted its judgment for that of HUD, and had simply
ruled on the "arbitrariness" of the Secretary's decision approving the
relocation plan.
"The lesson from TOOR v. HUD seems clear and wholly sound.
Where a relevant statute prescribes precise standards for
an administering agency, it is proper for courts to require
adherence to such standards. Where the statute provides
room for discretionary administrative action, such action
is to be upheld unless arbitrary. But content for the
standards of perinissable agency action in such cases may
be found from the agency's own rules and regulations."
(The Federal Courts and Urban Renewal, 69 Colum. L. Rev., 472)
The TOOR's logic for judicial review was given more rigorous
extension into administrative practices in Keith v. Volpe (352 F. Supp.
1324 (1972)), which involves the relocation of 6,000 families to be
displaced by the Century Freeway in Los Angeles. The court found that
the state relocation agency and Federal Highway Administration had
failed to properly compute the availability of adequate replacement
housing, and issued a preliminary injunction ordering the California
Division of Highways "to conduct additional housing availability
studies (with) further work on the freeway (to) be enjoined until
completion of those studies." As in Lathan v. Volpe the court did not
use the usual test of liklihood of success on the merits of plaintiffs'
claim, and indeed stated that "plaintiffs had failed to show that the
relocation services provided were insufficient", but issued the
injunction because it believed that any delay in relief would undermine
rights claimed by the relocatees. The overal.l language of the decision
____________________ II If
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is significant in that the court explicitly recognizes the rights
of relocatees to the benefits and services provided by the Uniform
Relocation Act, and makes it incumbent upon the agencies to demonstrate
the accuracy of their stated assurances that sufficient suitable
housing would be available.
In ruling that the state had failed to show that sufficient
suitable replacement housing would be available, the court referred
to provisions of Federal Highway Administration regulations
(IM 80-1-68, later IM 80-1-71, then PPM 81-1), requiring a comprehensive
study of available housing, discussion of the "methods and procedures
by which the needs of every individual to be displaced would be
evaluated and correlated with available decent, safe, and sanitary
housing", and an analysis of the inventory of replacement housing that
was available. Although the regulations do not specify techniques to
be used in computing the availability of housing suitable to the needs
of relocatees, the court admitted considerable evidence on techniques
of housing market analysis and based its decision largely on plaintiffs'
case that the methods used by the state were an inadequate measure
of housing availability. For example, the court ruled that the state's
use of turnover rates, multiplied by the number of occupied residences
in the area, was not an acceptable method to compute the amount of
housing expected to be available, since it ignored competition from
others besides displacees seeking housing in the area and ignored the
effect of demolition of housing for the highway. The court cited HUD's
Relocation Handbook, which states (Chpt. 4, p. 4):
"The use of turnover for relocation is not permissable.
Turnover is a process, not a resource. It is the dynamic
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operation by which occupancy changes occur within a standing
inventory over a period of time and theoretically could occur
in the complete absence of vacancies, on a person to
person basis."
The state had also failed to consider the number of rooms in the
rental housing reported as available, and the number of those
available which were decent, safe, and sanitary. In the words of the
court, "all of this information is crucial-to a complete picture of
the available supply of adequate replacement rental housing."
The Keith court obviously believed that, to achieve proper balance
in the equity interests before it, the weight of judicial review
should be extended on behalf of the relocatees. The court was even
less constrained by a WACO v. Romney concept (limiting the scope of
judicial review) than in TOORS, and In some instances prescribed
standards for the relocation program that are not explicitly provided
in the statute or FHWA regulations, for example the following:
"In order for the California Division of Highways to
defeat a displaced person's challenge to the adequacy of
his relocation payments, the Division must point to three
(emphasis added) comparable decent, safe, and sanitary
homes that are available to that person at a price that
is no more than the sum of the compensation that he received
from the state for his old home plus his supplemental
relocation payments."
The determination of the court in Keith v. Volpe is all the more
striking in view of the fact that the California Division of Highways
was undertaking the moving of acquired structures and renovating them
for replacement housing, and was also constructing 139 multi-family
units. The court found that, even with these measures underway, no one
could be sure, on the basis of the studies, that sufficient adequate
housing would be available. The time to determine whether the short-
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comings of the housing studies was significant, said the court, was
before anyone else was relocated. The court did not specify techniques
that might be allowed for the required housing studies, but ruled that
all pertinent factors were to be considered. This district court
decision has been appealed by the defendant federal and state agencies,
while the injunction remains in effect.2 5
As in Keith v. Volpe, a U.S. District Court in Michigan placed on
defendant agencies the burden of proving that their relocation program
was adequate. Sarah Sims Garrett, et al. v. City of Hamtramck
(357 F. Supp. 925 (1973)) is the most far reaching judicial prescription
to date applied to relocation programs. The plaintiffs were a group
of black families being displaced by an urban renewal project, code
enforcement, an expressway, and industrial expansion activities. The
court, in granting plaintiffs motions for relief, ordered a detailed
program of relocation services and replacement housing to be provided
by the city, with support of the relevant state and federal agencies.
The court determined that black residents of three neighborhoods
in Hamtramck were being displaced by an urban renewal project with the
deliberate attempt to force them out of the city. It found that due
to an extremely low.vacancy rate (not specified) and a racially
discriminatory and closed housing market in Hamtramck, the replacement
housing needed could not be obtained from the existing private market.
The court ruled, therefore, that the city (local displacing agency)
would have to build replacement housing in conjunction with an
agressive assistance program ensuring maximum utilization of vacancies
25. Dianne Wood, Mass. Department of Public Works memorandum, Nov. 1973
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in other housing. Moreover, rit only was the city responsible for
residents currently being displaced, but it would also be required
to assume responsibility for those who had been displaced, were
living in substandard units and who expressed a desire to relocate
again but could not find suitable housing in the city. Specifically,
the court ordered amendments in the urban renewal plan to provide new
housing for those who have been and are to be displaced by urban
renewal and other public actions in Hamtramck. The court went on to
detail the number, type, cost, size and location (same neighborhood
where physically feasible; as a minimum, within the same community)
of new units to be constructed; the procedures under which relocatees
were to be guaranteed priority admission to new units and vacancies
in existing units (and, the procedures under which these units are
to be inspected and referred to relocatees); and the present
administrative procedures that were to be waived, if necessary, to
ensure implementation of the court's other directives. As example
of the extent to which the court moved on the latter point, the
following is noted:
"...if any quotas, or administrative guidelines
with regard to the demographic make-up of tenants
eligible for publicly-assisted housing programs
conflict with the maximum use of Wyandotte (site
of court ordered new construction) for displacees,
the city and HUD will adjust or waive them..."
"to the extent the (court ordered) plan may
conflict with zoning ordinances, the ordinances
will be deemed inapplicable..."
a minimum of 430 units weLre ordered to be constructed, and the
6o
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city was further enjoined from taking any action in the affected
areas (such as changing zoning, to non-residential use, granting
demolition permits, etc.) which would reduce the areas residential
resources, until the re-housing needs of all displaced households
were met.
The court above appears to have relied primarily in this decision
on provisions of the Uniform Relocation Act, notably section 206 (a)
and (b) which provide that project funds may be used, if necessary,
to assure adequate replacement housing for each household. This
court was less constrained by debate on the provisions of agency
regulations, finding the statute itself a clear enough warrent for
its intervention. Moreover, in granting the plaintiffs original
motion for injunctive relief, the court in Garrett v. Hamtramck
(Civ. No. 32004, E.D. Mich. March 7, 1969) was also unequivocal
in its position that the relocatees' needs for housing, as questioned,
required a showing by the agency that the relocation program would
be adequate:
"defendants have failed to convince the court
that this housing now in existence will provide
adequate low-cost rental units to meet the needs
of those individuals who face displacement as shown
in the comprehensive renewal program." (Id. at 7)
In this most far reaching remedy, the court has again shown little
reluctance to place the full burden of proof in relocation programs
on defendant displacing agencies. Significantly, Garrett is the
first court action granting extensive relief, in the form of
replacement housing, to households already displaced. Another
important aspect of the Garrett decision is the fact that, unlike
__ _ _ ii n
61
in TOOR v. HUD and Keith v. Volpe, the court seems not to have
relied on detailed agency regulations as much as statutory provisions.
Keith, TOOR, and Garrett, all litigated since passage of the
Uniform Relocation Act in 1970, represent the furthest judicial
sentiment for applying meticulous standards in review of relocation
agency performance.
In Keith v. Volpe, the court applied a careful review of agency
performance in light of applicable regulations. The court allowed
plaintiffs to question the basis for the agency's assertions that
sufficient adequate replacement housing would be available, and
concluded that the agency had not considered all pertinent factors
in reaching its conclusion. The court has thus opened the technical
planning work of agency officials to judicial scrutiny, and has
established that it is encumbent upon the agencies to support the
findings required by statute and regulations with valid technical
analysis.
In TOOR v. HUD and Garrett v. Hamtramck the courts not only granted
injunctive relief to prevent families harm from an inadequate
relocation program, but also provided explicit instructions to the
displacing agencies for actions to be carried out that would assure
relocatees full benefit of applicable statutes and regulations. In
sharp contrast to WACO v. Romney, where the court in 1968 disclaimed
any attempt to administer the "complexities of urban development,"
the TOOR and Garrett decisions find the courts directing aspects of
urban development. It is apparent, to the courts in TOOR and Garrett
anyway, that provisions of the Uniform Relocation Act of 1970 and
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related agency regulations have necessitated a fundamental change
in the court's role on behalf of relocatees. In the eyes of the
court, the realities of displacing agencies' performance at times
make the extremes of judicial scrutiny and relief necessary to
further the objective of Congress that displaced persons shall not
suffer disproportionate injury as a result of programs undertaken
for the overall public good.
Outline of Litigation Strategies
The courts rulings in the cases reviewed suggest some general
guidelines for future litigation on behalf of relocatees.
The issue of standing, which-had plagued the earliest attempts
of relocatees seeking judicial relief, appears to have been firmly
resolved. Since Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Authority, and
Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, the courts have consistently
held that renewal and highway displacees have the right to judicial
review of agency action.
Standards for the timing of litigation also appear well
established. It appears that only in the most exceptional cases
will the courts consider granting relief to relocatees claims post
facto, and in the litigation thus far only claims of constitutional
stature, such as the fourteenth amendment violations cited by the
court in Sara Sims Garrett et al v. Hamtramck, have qualified. Strong
pronouncements by the courts in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, Lathan v.
Volpe, TOOR v. HUD, and Keith v. Volpe indicate that the time to
seek judicial remedy is prior to relocation, or at least before many
people have moved.
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Although certain courts have, as a practical matter, extended
the scope of judicial review beyond that held valid in WACO v.
Romney and others, the theory that there are limits to judicial
intervention in decisions statutorily prescribed to agency officials
remains a concern of the courts. Even in Keith v. Volpe, where a
most extensive scrutiny of agency findings was carried out, the
court was very careful in its language to avoid implication that a
judicial judgment had been substituted for the reasonable exercise
of agency discretion. It would seem prudent, therefore, to construct
arguments in litigation around notions that the agency actions
are "arbitrary" and "without any reasonable basis in fact."
The courts have been impressed by what is considered the "Strong
policy declaration" of the Uniform Relocation Act, and appear
increasingly disposed toward providing relocatees in litigation the
benefit of doubt (at least temporarily), as against more stringent
agency review. A potentially promising line of reasoning might
follow where relocatees had been shown to suffer "disproportionate
injury" in violation of the statutory intent. For example, although
the courts have thus far not ruled on many of the problems of
interpretation discussed in the first part of this chapter, one can
speculate that a court might be favorably disposed to hear such
arguments where, in a detailed factual situation, the plight of
plaintiff relocatees was shown to contrast Congressional sentiment
explicit in the history and development of legislation. William
0. Douglas used an analogous form of reasoning in his dissenting
opinion in Dandridge v. Williams (397 U.S. Sup. Ct. (1969)), a case
____ ff
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involving a State's regulation of AFDC benefits. In his brief,
Justice Douglas outlined the history of social security legislation,
amplifying applicable judicial maxims with testimony from Congressional
committees, statutory declarations of purpose, agency memoranda and
policy statements, and legislative hearing transcripts. From
similar sources, which contain a substantial body of information
on relocation problems, some persuasive references might be added
to a case having sound judicial arguments and clear factual
circumstances.
Ii
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PARTICIPATION AND EFFECT: CASE STUDIES OF TACTICS TO
IMPROVE THE RELOCATION PROCESS
Introduction
Each project requiring decisions on displacement will have a unique
context, demanding knowledge of the particular families and businesses
affected, local political dynamics, and operating capabilities of the
agencies that will plan and carry out relocation. The four cases de-
scribed in this chapter were selected for the range of tactical consid-
erations involved in efforts to upgrade the process on behalf of relo-
catees. The perspective is that of someone outside the formal structure
of the displacing agency, while Chapter Four is the view from within. In
all cases the particular objectives pursued have been 1) to get people
who might be displaced more say in project decisions, directly through
their involvement or indirectly through the effective application of
laws, regulations, and other persuasion on their behalf, and 2) to get
people who are being displaced more sympathetic treatment fromthose who
administer relocation programs. Success or failure of the tactics applied
should be measured at least on these grounds.
The cases appear in chronological sequence. Case III, the Boston
Transportation Planning Review, is the most fully developed. Comments
in that section, and in the final pages, on the "technician's" place in
the political process may be most relevant to planners, especially those
involved in projects having a broad spectrum of public participants.
Careful positioning of the personal role is a difficult task in writing,
but a most useful effort for the demands of responsible professionalism
and citizenry.
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I. Woburn Downtown Renewal
A renewal project in downtown Woburn, Massachusetts, was slated to
displace about 150 Spanish speaking (mostly Puerto Rican) families. The
state Department of Community Affairs (DCA), with which I was employed
as a housing and relocation specialist, had legal responsibility to
approve a plan for relocation of the families. The federal Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had already given its endorse-
ment, and the project was to go ahead contingent upon DCA approval.
The Woburn Redevelopment Authority (WRA) had submitted a plan to
DCA and HUD for relocation of the 150 families, stating that housing
meeting federal and state requirements would be available for all house-
holds within 18 months. Their plan showed most families having income in
the $8-10,000 and up annual range (1969), which would have been neces-
sary for them to afford the over $200 per month apartments anticipated to
be available. As DCA was to discover, many families had no income what-
soever. Furthermore, it was extremely unlikely that 150 Spanish-speaking
families could be absorbed into the local housing market at any price.
The Redevelopment Authority intended that their displacees would move
to Boston (20 miles), Lowell (20 miles), or Puerto Rico (2000 miles?),
contrary to state regulations assuring housing within the same community.
The tactical situation called for data to dispute WRA's submission.
With an interpreter carefully selected for her sympathy towards
Puerto Rican immigrants, interviews were conducted with most of the
would-be displaced households. Redevelopment Authority staff had re-
fused to accompany us (raising all the more suspicions about where the
original information had come from), stating that tensions were high in
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the Spanish community and that we would be refused entry and possibly
harassed. All doors were open, and all families spoke, though hesitat-
ingly at first out of expressed fear of reprisals. It seemed that al-
most all were very recent immigrants, many drawn to Woburn by advertise-
ments in San Juan papers guaranteeing jobs and places to live.. The jobs,
for the few who got them, were $1.75 per hour greenhouse laboring, season-
ally available. The living quarters were $200 per month., 3-5 room rat
infested four story walk-ups (vintage 1890), with holes in the walls,
cracks in the ceilings, missing windows, errant heat and water. Most
families signed one-year leases before they moved in. Almost all fam-
ilies had color television sets and stereos which had been sold to them
on credit the day of their arrival. Some families had no income at all,
having been refused welfare by the local office, and several were plan-
ning imminent returns to Puerto Rico. Most dreamed openly of a single
family home in the suburbs, with a vegetable garden and friendly Eng-
lish speaking neighbors.
The agent for these shattered illusions was the city's leading real
estate holder, who owned most of the property to be acquired by urban
renewal, and who was reputed to be a close friend of the chairman of the
Redevelopment Authority board.
Armed with this depressing but solid data, DCA staff began a series
of well-documented exchanges with the Redevelopment Authority--telephone
calls, memoranda, formal and informal conversations aimed at drawing
out further misrepresentations from the WRA staff, and all justified by
acceptable bureaucratic practice.1 The WRA executive director ( a for-
1Ultimately, DCA was to probe the entire WRA operation and assist the
Globe's spotlight team in an investigation. The paper's reports on il-
legal real .estate transfers led to indictments and defeat from office fo
4PA 41-" -
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mer Army colonel who openly disliked poor people in particular and minor-
ities--he described the affected Spanish-speaking families as "dirty,"
"noisy," and "immoral"-- backed up by the mayor, responded by charging
to the governor and anyone who would listen, that DCA's Deputy Commis-
sioner, a black man, hated white people and was trying to destroy their
project.
DCA staff continued their bureaucratic machinations, demanding more
and more data on the families to be displaced and on housing resources
in Woburn. Eventually, the WRA bargained for a few more low cost housing
units in the renewal plan, but it wasn't enough. Finally a confrontation
with the city council, mayor, redevelopment authority board and staff
developed--the mayor had called a meeting, wanting to know how the pro-
ject could be moved ahead. Judy Hart, Director of the Bureau of Relo-
cation, and I, were DCA's representatives.
The Redevelopment Authority staff was totally unprepared for the
documented case we brought to that meeting. One by one, their statements
of "fact," allegations and insinuations of DCA's blockings and the Puerto
Rican families' wealth, were refuted by quotations from their own mem-
oranda and telephone conversations (carefully recorded by date, time,
and word for word recollection), and from our own interviews with the
families. After a particularly illuminating exchange, the mayor re-
quested that the chairman of the Redevelopment Authority consider re-
placing his executive director. The mayor's outrage was a ploy, of
course, and the director was never replaced, but the effect of our ex-
changes was devastating. No more complaints to the governor. Complete.
submission to DCA's requirements for amendments to the renewal plan.
Unfortunately, the renewal plan never did go ahead as hoped for, as
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the Redevelopment Authority was not really interested in providing new
housing for residents within the Spanish community. The same deplorable
conditions remain for the households we interviewed or their successors.
Improvements have been made by the few Spanish owners in the area who
rehabilitated some rental units with low interest renewal loans. Hope-
fully, the community was better organized internally by their involvement
in the unexpected victory over wholesale displacement, which they ap-
plauded, although few leaders were in evidence. The tactical lesson
learned was that of applying cold, bureaucratic documentation when your
opposition has unwittingly supplied all that's needed.
71
!l li-.
II. The Cape Cod Housing Crisis
In the spring of 1970 a well publicized protest of low income tenants
was underway throughout Cape Cod, engineered by the local Community
Action Program (CAP) and legal services agencies. For years (since the
late '50's tourist boom), low income residents of Cape Cod had been
accustomed to eviction from their winter rentals for three summer months,
when the properties they occupied increased in value five-fold. During
this time they lived from the trunks of automobiles, illegally camped in
the woods, or crowded in with more fortunate friends and relatives.
Many of the households were female-headed and AFDC recipients. About 100
of the estimated 700-1000 families in such circumstances had risen in
protest this particular spring on the exhortations of CAP staff who pro-
mised forestalled evictions and year-round leases through the state's
(Department of Community Affairs) Chapter 707 low income leasing pro-
gram.2
By the time of my involvement as one of DCA's agents to obtain leases
for these families through the local housing authorities (who normally
administer the 707 program, though DCA can supercede them), CAP staff
and tenants had picketed the governor's office and, supported by a sym-
pathetic press, obtained from him a public promise that DCA would do all
possible to help the tenants. The tenants had been unsuccessful gaining
leases through conventional channels and charged the local housing auth-
orities with foot-dragging stemming from bigotry towards the poor. DCA,
2 The 707 leasing program provides to a private landlord on behalf of
a low income tenant the difference between fair market rent and the fam-
ily's ability to pay (25% of income defined). Leases are signed for 12-
18 months (renewable) with the state guaranteeing full payment if the te-
nant should default and payment for all damages incurred during occupancy.
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who had authority over funding and board appointments within local housing
authorities, was to exercise their influence and get leases signed. Pri-
vately, the governor (Frank Sargent) passed the word that he was not very
pleased by the circumstances and that he personally thought low income
people should not occupy year-round " homes that provide modest income
working families a great Cape Cod vacation they couldn't afford in
hotels."3
Skillful tactician that he was, the governor's chief aide (Al Kramer)
pleased his boss but made sure that all blame publicly fell upon the DCA
Commissioner (Leon Charkoudian), who was a holdover from the Volpe ad-
ministration and who, in Kramer's words, generally 'didn't bleed enough
Br the poor." The chief mechanism by which this was accomplished was
failure to come up with funds for the 707 leases. The program was al-
rady fully committed through the fiscal. year (which was about to end) and
that year's legislature gave no indication of extending authorization
for the upcoming fiscal year beyond leases already in effect. DCA feared
that overextension would cause leasing defaults statewide, which in ad-
dition to forcing the eviction of existing tenants, would weaken the ten-
uous bond housing authorities had with private landlords (late payments
by tenants and the state were commonplace) and result in no future leases.
These fears were realized in several instances, although the more respon-
sible housing authorities (on DCA's urging) made good on leases tempor-
arily with other revenues.
Unfortunately, legislators were also unsympathetic to the Cape Cod
3Sargent is from Orleans on Cape Cod. Whether the sentiment was
deeply felt or not, he no doubt was feeling pressure from conservative
allies there.
I,
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tenants and cited them, as well as DCA's bad management, as factors that
should limit additional leasing authorization. Complicating this -was an
attempt that year by the legislature's self-appointed housing specialist,
David Liederman (now secretary to Governor Dukakis), to appendix the
request for 707 leasing revenues to his omnibus community development
corporation bill. A last minute plea from several housing advocate groups
released 707 from Liederman's deadweight proposal (not passed since). Al-
together, the entire 707 leased housing program (which had over 2000
leases in execution throughout the state) was nearly washed down the
drain, and barely survived through the next fiscal year with a last min-
ute deficiency budget appropriation.
Not knowing that their fate had been largely sealed by a "conciliatory"
Governor Sargent and an unsympathetic legislature, the tenants contirued
to press the issue. Al Kramer's genius kept the Governor off the hook,
as the DCA Commissioner looked meaner and meaner for his failure to sign
leases. Frustrated, CAP and the tenants committed some terrible tacti-
cal blunders, among them the following.:
(1) Picketing the home of a bank president, one day after DCA staff had
pleaded, cajoled, and weasled a committment from him to lease 14 of the
homes he owned to low income tenants. CAP had known of this meeting but
failed to check the results. The banker immediately withdrew the offer,
and advised his friends who together managed substantial Ioldings, not
to cooperate.
(2) Picketing of the Bourne Bridge during Memorial Day traffic, holding
up the Cape's lifeblood for several hours. CAP had trapped themselves by
asserting that unless a certain number of leases had been signed by Mem-
orial Day, this tactic would be employed. Whatever warm corpuscles of
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sympathy might have run in the veins of Cape Cod capitalists were perman-
ently frozen by this maneuver. Many times, after agonizing efforts to
convince landlords that long term leases offered financial as well as
humanitarian rewards, DCA staff were told that "the money doesn't matter;
we aren't going to patronize those disruptors."
(3) Continued antagonism of DCA staff by the CAP agency and the tenant
leaders. By the middle of the summer DCA staff was working very long
days in a very frustrating effort to obtain leases. No amount of expla-
nation could convince CAP and the tenants that honest effort was being
put forth, largely because several CAP staff had goaded the tenants into
believing that DCA was not contacting willing landlords. Some even
produced names of landlords that proved non-existent. This was neces-
sary, I think, to defend their tactical failures. To be sure, DCA man-
agement was hesitant to sign any leases for reasons already described,
but the staff had tracked down every conceivable lead. With no support
at either end, such harried effort was debilitating at best. Many nights
I longed for the relative peace of my cheap Dorchester apartment, and
more than once wondered whether the conservative position, that the
tenants' demands were unreasonable , did indeed have some merit.
(4) Continued harassment of uncooperative housing authority members, at
their homes and businesses. While several housing authority executive
directors and board members actively fought the leased housing program4 ,
41t is axiomatic that some housing authority officials, on Cape Cod
and elsewhere, take their position in order to keep low income housing
out of the community, rather than see its implementation. The Yarmouth
and Barnstable directors were the worst in this regard I've ever ex-
perienced.
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CAP's harassment gave them a cause, a justification for their recalci-
trance, that might have otherwise been lacking. Some housing authority
members even received sympathetic endorsements they had not presumed to
exist, from offended fellow citizens. Some redoubled their efforts.
These points barely scratch the surface of the complex, myriad tactical
ploys in evidence during this first and biggest year of the Cape Cod
housing crisis. The view is limited, but as a sympathetic andactive
apporter of the tenants' cause, I believe the criticisms are justified.
Less than 30 leases were executed out of a need estimated to be over
700 families. In the end, the only leases signed were with landlords in
deep financial difficulty, because of their unsuccessful speculation in
new construction or as a result of the successful efforts of legal se.-
ices lawyers to quash eviction proceedings on technicalities. The legal
services people maintained a low profile throughout, and won respect from
Cape Codders (who did not like them) as competent, hard-working lawyers.
Unfortunately, landlords eventually learned the lawyers' game as well,
and the following year saw landlords more careful in the legalities of
eviction.
The lawyers' tactics, however, were not intended to be permanent, as
they were part of a larger strategy to gain tenants early, decisive vic-
tories that summer. One could argue that the tenants, and CAP, did the
best they could under the circumstances, as most Cape Codders' beliefs
about civil responsibilities lie rooted in their seventeenth century
heritage of "self-reliance." (Emerson would be impressed). They are
an extremely conservative lot, and not supporting low income tenants was
no violation of legal civil rights. The landlords are also ardent cap-
italists, whose tastes remained sweetened by yearly increases in their
vacation revenues. At the very least, attention was drawn to a problem
long overlooked. But the tactics were ineffective. The original follow-
ing of tenants substantially diminished over time, as did the support of
others. Those who received leases were the hard core activists, and too
few additional families have profited since. The architects of the tenanta
resistence failed to understand crucial local phenomenology,5 and applied
tactics which, while successful in urban welfare rights organizing, were
inappropriately extended in the particular situation.
The Cape Cod housing crisis was not the result of a public agency's
displacing activities. But it is extremely revealing of the sensitive
dynamic that exists between public and private advocates for housing and
the landlords who must be relied upon to supply resources. All relocatior
assistance efforts depend upon the good relations between casework staff
and the market suppliers. Although the housing market is usually char-
acterized by a number of independent owners, some or many may be effec-
tively controlled by a single real estate broker (see Chapter Four) and
most will be influenced by others in the community knowledgeable of the
relocation program. In smaller communities particularly, they may be
very sensitive to the image conveyed by staff and others connected with
the project. If relations sour, for whatever reasons, displaced house-
holds (and businesses) may find their choices in the private market
to be limited or non-existent.
5. Most CAP staff were out of staters, though I believe that personal-
ities, rather than geographic origins, were what most got in their way.
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III. The Boston Transportation Planning Review
The Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) was a precedent
shattering forum for decision making on highway and transit projects.
The Governor had temporarily halted normal work of the transportation
agencies on 1-95 in Boston and the North Shore, and on 1-695, the
Inner Belt, in Cambridge, Somerville, and Boston, while a group of
largely outside professionals and concerned local citizens reviewed
the technical and political wisdom of proceedings to that point.6 For
the first time in American planning history the Implicit relations
within and impinging upon formal government bureaucracy in realizing
highway and transit projects were made visible and accountable
(somewhat) to the concerned public. An "open planning process" was
Introduced which, in the minds of most who- played it out, left elected
officials better informed (though more shaky) about their decislons;
which left professional engineers and planners more embarassed than
ever (though ironically richer then and now) about the state of their
knowledge; and which in the end, seemed to favor not building highways
and providing more public transportation. The wisdom of the decision
and fairness of the process will be debated for some time. BTPR was,
at the very least, a unique opportunity to observe the fuller political
machinery in motion, and for more participants than usual to play a
part in it normally made impossible by the machine's obscurantism.
6Forces which shaped the Governor's decision to hold this review
are discussed in A. Lupo et, al., -Rites of Way.
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Note on the "technicians" role...
I served as a member of BTPR's technical staff of planners,
architects, lawyers, community liason people, and engineers whose
job was to advise (not recommend) the Governor on so-called technical
matters pertinent to his decisions.
While it was fashionable to call ourselves "mere technicians," I was
to learn of the controversial role such professionals play in the
social system, to wit, they are political actors not duly elected and
not accountable to the public as are the more visibly labeled
"politicians." The same of course is true of government agency
personnel. This means that although the actions of certain technocrats,
individually or in a formal organization, have enormous political
implications, their political philosophy .s not open to question, well
hidden as it is behind neutral sounding technical jargon. Professional
behavior, however, indeed the jargon itself, often manifests deeply
held political prejudices.
Some will argue that a technicians role is not political because
work follows standards and client relationships openly established in
professional practices and contracts (or job descriptions) for the
service provided. But the public understands neither technical
standards, professional mores, job descriptions, nor contract
relationships, so their political effect is masked. Also, the mere
7Which is not to say that politicians' thinking is any more "visible"
because of their public exposure -- but politicians do have to provide
the public some justification for the outcomes of their effort, and
are "hired" on this basis.
79
Ii
80
If U________
fact that technocrats affect people makes them political -- they direct
and apply relations based upon relative power in the social system.
Therefore, I believe, any technocrat has to answer for the effect
of his or her work in a political context. Striving solely for "good
professionalism" is not enough, and in fact frequently masks self-serving
escapism. Moreover, those who deny political effect may become
unwitting tools of the more politically astute. The responsibility
demands close analysis of the effect of one's work on the public.
It is from this perspective, of an involved technician, that
tactics will be discussed. Some further notes on the subject are
offered in the last pages of this chapter.
a. Hiring status -- By the summer of 1971 (the Governor had declared
his moratorium in February, 1970), BTPR began hiring professional
staff. A requirement of the interagency agreement which created
BTPR was to enroll several persons from the Department of Community
Affairs, where I worked. One issue in this hiring was whether
agency personnel would become employees of a particular consulting
8
firm, or be retained on a personal services contract as self employed
consulting entities reporting to the study management. The personal
services contract was chosen for former state agency employees, for
8Alan M. Voorhees (AMV) was prime contractor and responsible for
technical management. Subcontractors included Skidmore, Owings and
Merrill and David A. Crane Associates; (architects and urban designers);
F.R. Harris (engineering); Wallace, Floyd and Ellenzweig, and Jason
A. Cortell Associates (natural environment); Real Estate Research
Corporation (social and economic environment).
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a number of reasons. Chief among them, I think, was the study
director's9 belief that interests could be balanced better by
allegiance to the BTPR entity rather than a firm. Those on personal
services contract were presumed to be returning to their former
agencies when BTPR ended, although expected to disenroll from their
agency's activities until then. In my case, the arrangement was to
allow greater freedom within BTPR as well as an implicit continued
relationship to the Department of Community Affairs. Both were to
prove tactical advantages, as will be shown.
b. Contract and budget -- It was understood by the agency which
"released" me and by BTPR management that my work would focus on
topics germane to the Department of Community Affairs, especially
family and business relocation. "Family Relocation and Replacement
Housing" and "Business Relocation and Employment" comprised two of
BTPR's 12 discrete study elements. Contract budget for the two
exceeded $350,000, or roughly 10 percent of BTPR's $3.5 million funds.
Overall, I would estimate that less than $30,000 was spent by BTPR
on these concerns. Principal reasons for this and their tactical
implications are as follows: 1) It quickly became evident that BTPR's
budget for "Impacts on the Natural Environment" was inadequate for
the work demanded by pressure groups in that area. Notably, the
9Jack Wofford, a long standing figure in the moratorium debate and
one of the principle architects of the Planning Review. He reported
directly to the Governor and was jointly responsible with Walt
Hansen (AMV), study manager, for conduct of the review.
10Even accepting BTPR management's extremely liberal interpretation
of relocation tasks, at most $60,000, or one-sixth of the budgeted
amount was spent. Much of this amount had little to do with sub-
stantive relocation problems, or even with the contract.
Sierra Club, the Environmental Coalition, the Greater Boston Committee
on the Transportation Crisis, and a number of very vocal private
citizens lobbied effectively for resource inventories and analyses
not anticipated in the original contract. In contrast, no one outside
of technical staff (and that only myself) fought for relocation studies.
As a result, the relocation budget was spent largely on environmental
inventories. 2) The budget problem was symptomatic of a larger
concern for the relocation effort overall, namely, lack of support
from BTPR participants. Pro-highway forces, including the funding
agencies, did not wish to see the relocation problem probed too deeply
and, indeed, insisted that there was no problem which their existing
programs could not effectively manage. Anti-highway forces wanted
the potential impacts of displacement to be exposed, but would not
support efforts to plan improved relocation programs and procedures
(the largest part of the work) so long as the possibilities for
no-build remained. Tactical response to these positions, which were
each untenable from the standpoint of persons who might be displaced,
is discussed as appropriate in subsequent sections.
Unfortunately efforts to organize potential relocatees to
effectively oppose highway displacement had been unsuccessful. The
highway's peculiar spatial requirements are partly responsible. Only
a relatively small section of any particular neighborhood was affected,
as the highway stretched ribbonlike along an already established rail
corridor in the case of the Southwest Expressway in Boston. The
diverse neighborhoods affected like Roxbury and Hyde Park, had little
in common. Groups of people who knew each other were smaller still,
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and overall the population of relocatees contained many household
types, incomes, ethnicity, tenure, stage in life cycle, and length
of residence. The only variable to link a substantial number of
people was the displacement itself, which for the most part, contrary
to popular myth, is an insufficient rallying point (see Chapter Four).
Once the initial shock wears off, as it had in Boston years before,
most people accept relocation as part of their social responsibility,
especially when they're told about present day payments for fair
market value and increased homeownership and rental costs. Moreover,
the average person is intimidated by government and finds resistence
or complaint difficult. This is especially true of older people, who
can be most traumatized by the loss of familiar surroundings, and
most aggrieved financially because of low fixed incomes (see also
Chapters Two and Four).
By the time relocatees realize how difficult and costly it is to
find a replacement home, and how much the old neighborhood really
meant to them, the project may be well underway. At this point their
protests appear feeble, and are usually unanswered, as the political
ducks become Committedin some way to the construction project
(patronage jobs, etc.). Such had been the case in Boston for 1-95
(over 900 families had been displaced prior to the moratorium), and
most potentially displaced families were resigned to their presumed
fate. 3) Although lack of resources was a constant source of
frustration (convincing arguments often need data which can be
expensive to obtain. The environmentalists knew this when they
successfully pressed for more money), and although the potential
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for support from participants was low, tactical implications were
not so grim. For example, penetration, scope, and attention to the
relocation effort would be less than hoped for, but control over the
technical product was potentially greater. At some point a position
would be required-from BTPR on matters of relocation, and at that
time participants might be focused by a carefully prepared technical
product, in a way that would serve the objectives for change better
than a weightier, but compromising document.
c. Control of the technical product -- As noted, BTPR staff was
comprised of a number of consulting firms supplemented by agency and
other people for particular expertise. Essentially, each firm was
assigned responsibility for entire study elements. The firms reported
to the technical manager (Walt Hansen of AMV) who had overall
responsibility for the contract and budget. (The firms were sub-
contractors of AMV. My personal services contract was with the
entity, BTPR). Real Estate Research Corporation (of which Tony
Downs is chief honcho, though called in only on special occasions
during BTPR) was assigned the social and economic impacts elements
(family relocation, business relocation, effects on the local and
regional economy, and neighborhood cohesion).
Real Estate Research (RERC) sought to concentrate its entire
resources producing reports on the overall local and regional economic
effects, partially because of participant pressure but also because
of their staff skills. They exhibited no expertise whatsoever in
relocation matters. The first three months of my employment with
BTPR, working under RERC, was spent manipulating census data
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which I wrote into discussion of overall population and housing trends
in the communities and regions under study. RERC's chief concern
was the production of massive pro forma reports, traditional in
transportation planning, that would focus on an area much too broad
for understanding of localized relocation phenomena. Planners who
failed to recognize this in other transportation studies had made
relocation concerns negligible in project decisions.
My experience in relocation to that time had also convinced me that
there would be no response from agency officials, and thus no chance
to influence program implementation, and no chance for possible remedy
through judicial action, unless relocation analyses were explicitly
related to the legal and regulatory requirements then in effect. (See
Chapter Two) I therefore set out to assure that BTPR's work would
follow along these lines.
RERC was unconvinced that relocation was so localized a phenomenon
(not surprisingly, since they had no experience in it and that notion
fit their larger scheme for things), and study management did not buy
arguments that contract requirements were not being met. I then went
to my colleagues at the Department of Community Affairs, who tactfully
maintained that it would be best to raise the issues over some published
material of BTPR that they could formally review.
The next public meeting handout mentioned the problem of family
relocation but alluded only to general trends in community population
and housing in describing its parameters. (I had suggested that
relocation needed to be discussed in this handout, but judiciously
avoided comment on the product.) Department of Community Affairs
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"experts" took umbrage with the BTPR publication, arguing !t to be
irrelevant and misleading as a relocation effort. Judy Hart, Director
of the Bureau of Relocation and my former supervisor, went so far as
to suggest that RERC couldn't handle the job of relocation planning
(she had additional documentation for this conclusion - several
conversations with RERC's principal agent). Ms. Hart was backed up by
the DCA Commissioner who had been carefully briefed in advance. BTPR
management, being as sensitive' as it was to image with the public and
state agencies, responded by questioning RERC on its intentions to
overcome DCA's objections. RERC had no response and surrendered
authority over the relocation product when a work program was produced
for relocation studies, sanctioned by Community Affairs.
The net gain, for what it took to accomplish, was not very impressive
on the surface. RERC lost one technician and some prestige, while
BTPR gained support from the Department of Community Affairs and could
be more wary of DCA's input in the future. All future tactical
leverage, however, rested on control of the technical product. From
a larger political perspective, key elements here were a) an agency
(DCA) concerned with some degree of social change (improved relocation)
and capable of expressing that concern (through an articulate represen-
tative, backed at the top), and b) a process (BTPR) which could
respond to different technical disciplines and which was committed to
a high degree of political consensus for its work.
d. Timing of reports -- Having established a position of some leverage
within BTPR's structure, chief tactical concerns became the content,
timing, and distribution of technical reports. In my experience I have
II It
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never observed an audience more thirsting for written material than the
BTPR participants. Every proposed work effort, every tentative
finding, every speculated conclusion that could be distributed in
memorandum form or public meeting handout was scrutinized by technicians,
private citizens and others involved in the day to day BTPR effort.
Those of potential import to the larger pro or anti-highway or transit
positions were widely distributed to community leaders, elected
officials, and advocate interest groups. The Boston Globe ran front
page and editorial accounts of BTPR's technical work and public
meetings during the latter months of the study, while local television
and radio programs several times held forums which included BTPR
staff and public participants. (Study management had decided in the
beginning to maintain an open file on all staff memoranda, although it
is likely they would have been forced into this position anyway.)
With such scrutiny of his or her work, a staff person's primary
concern should have been to maintain credible technical effort. Those
who got too sloppy were effectively neutralized. Short memos were
better than long ones, and simple language was more effective than
jargon (although certain buzz words appeared again and again).
Supportable numbers, especially in clearly presented statistical
analyses, and any "new" facts were most impressive. Editorializing
was anathema.
Timing was as important as content in this fast paced production
effort, and opportunities could be lost forever. One's ear had to be
everywhere to know when answers were being called for.
One of the most fortuitous situations for the relocation effort
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occured following an encount-r with another staff member, who was
preparing a report on the Inner Belt. Half way through BTPR, the
Governor had promised some "Phase II decisions and when the time arrived
it was generally conceded that he would formally kill the highly
unpopular Inner Belt, which would have displaced 1700 families in
Cambridge and Somerville in addition to uprooting the Fenway and other
parts of Back Bay. 11 This maneuver would free resources for application
to more feasible projects and might be seen as a concession to the
anti-highway forces who clearly held the upper hand at that point.
Spurned to action by my colleague, I wrote a quick memorandum arguing
(with supportable housing market and neighborhood studies and
appropriate citations from federal and state law and regulations)
that "the Brookline-Elm alignment of the Inner Belt presents such
severe relocation problems in Cambridge and Somerville that a humane
relocation program meeting existing legal and administrative
standards is not possible." 2
It would be misleading to suggest that the Governor decided not to
build the Inner Belt because he believed relocation could not be
legally accomplished, or even if he did, that under other circumstances
11. It is interesting to note that much of the impact of this road
could have been avoided by a routing through the town of Brookline
when the project was first conceived. But Brookline is rich and well-
connected politically, and the original highway builders did not think
the poor and working class families to be displaced (and their Harvard
MIT advocates) would hold it up as long as they did.
12. F. Mahady, "Inner Balt: Family Relocation in Cambridge and
Somerville," Memo to BTPR participants. File: B. 6. 12 Ref: 920
December 6, 1971
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relocation should have been sufficient cause not to proceed. However,
precisely that notion became a large part of the official position.
In fact, BTPR had been searching for "analytical findings" to support
dropping the Inner Belt, indeed to justify its own efforts, and
relocation fit the bill perfectly. The Governor had a supportable,
technical conclusion to back up his decision. Most important for the
relocation effort, a precedent was set for the serious application of
relocation standards in project decisions, and for certain interpretation
of statutes and agency regulations that underlay the judgment. These
were to be crucial in future, less certain outcomes.
Another example of particularly good timing, from a tactical
standpoint, was distribution of the first "working paper" on family
displacement for the Southwest Expressway (1-95 in Roxbury, Jamaica
Plain, Roslindale, Hyde Park, Milton and Dedharn). Working papers, in
BTPR parlance, were the catch-all to describe work in progress, their
chief tactical advantage being the timing by which issues were surfaced.
The Southwest Expressway was the most controversial of all projects
under study. Many families and businesses had already been relocated,
and much of the land was cleared for the would-be road in Roxbury and
Jamaica Plain. It was the project pro-highway forces felt had the best
chance of being built, and the one anti-highway forces believed would
most test credibility of the "open planning" process. Roxbury
advocates, led by Chuck Turner of Operation Stop, fought vociferously
for control of the cleared land, arguing that industrial, commercial,
and housing were better uses for the community than a suburban oriented
freeway. Environmentalists, led by Herbert Meyer, Arthur Katz,
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Susan Clippenger and others of the Greater Boston Committee on the
Transportation Crisis and the Environmental Coalition, lobbied to save
the Fowl Meadow Reservation in Milton, a vast marsh with untapped
drinking water stored beneath and a unique waterfowl habitation which
would be bifurcated by the original highway alignment. The Jamaica
Plain Citizens Committee and their counterparts in Dedham wanted trucks
off local residential streets, citing accident and nuisance factors,
and the highway solved this problem. Hyde Park and Roslindale
businessmen wanted improved accessibility, which they felt would bolster
the fading economies of Cleary and Roslindale Squares, and were
supported in questing for the road by their umbrella Greater Boston
Chamber of Commerce. The Mayor of Boston, through his transportation
expert Fred Salvucci (now Secretary of Transportation for Massachusetts,
having replaced Alan Altshuler), argued against the project for its
impact on Central Artery Traffic congestion and limited downtown parking.
Transit and commuter rail advocates saw -the highway defeating ridership
potential, particularly at proposed suburban terminals along Route 128.
Construction workers, represented by John Carroll of MATCQ (now
Commissioner of Mass. Public Works Department), cited depressing
employment figures in their support of the build decision.
Into the breach of the Southwest Expressway controversy, a working
paper on residential relocation was thrust at a time in which, by
coincidence, no other staff memoranda were being circulated. Further-
more, no significant new issues had been raised on the Southwest
Expressway for months prior to this paper. These two conditions,
consciously realized, would have made release of the report a tactical
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maneuver bordering on genius. Realistically, it was luck on my part.
The effect was the same nevertheless.
It seemed that everyone read the paper (myself and others saw that
it got wide distribution initially), and the status of relocation as
an issue in the Southwest Expressway changed overnight. The report had
analyzed relocation of families to date, arguing that housing had been
available by the coincidence of a number of new construction projects
being completed in the final stages of citywide urban renewal and
rehabilitation programs. No such resources could be anticipated in the
future. The report further critiques performance of the state Depart-
ment of Public Works, showing that households had significantly increased
expenditures for smaller homes in poorer neighborhoods and, relying on
other studies (chiefly one by Dr. Ellen Fitzgerald done under an NIMH
grant with the Boston University Division of Psychiatry), that households
were generally dissatisfied and internally disrupted by the experience.
Moreover, perhaps most significantly to the highway issue as seen by
participants, the report showed that a much larger number of families
than had ever previously reen reported remained to be displaced,
particularly in the most cohesive neighborhoods and tight housing markets
of Roslindale and Hyde Park. 13
Relocation impacts became another cause celebre for the anti-highway
forces in the Southwest Corridor. In addition, because of particular
design problems, it was shown that a Southwest Expressway facility of
more than four highway lanes in width would have displaced almost twice
as many families, a factor which contributed to the Governor's limiting
13. F. Mahady, "Working Paper on Residential.Relocation in the Southwest
Corridor" File: B. 5. 12. Ref: 920 Feb. 17, 1972.
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of all highway proposals to four lanes or less, which in turn diminished
the traffic services (and travel time savings) benefits of an ultimate
build decision.
Another tactical lesson learned was that where controversial findings
are to be revealed, it is best to broach the issues early and build on
the initial reactions. The tone for subsequent memoranda, some more
controversial, particularly with respect to agency operations and the
necessity for building replacement housing, was better set by knowledge
of key actors' reactions to the issues raised in this working paper.
e. The Southwest Corridor Final Report -- It was by no means certain
until days before he announced it, how the Governor would decide the
Southwest Expressway. Over 400 families could remain to be displaced
and, since only so much gore could be presented to justify no
displacement, a positive relocation program was absolutely essential
to provide protection to these families. The objectives were
threefold:
1) Provide the decision makers a relocation program they
would be committed to publicly, in the event the road were
to be built.
2) Express the program in such a way that the no build
argument would not be weakened, and could thus have support
of the anti-highway forces as well.
3) Provide material for a litigants case, that could be
carried independently by relocatee advocates, that would
serve families to be displaced and the 100 plus households
who would remain in state-owned property (acquired but not
It________
yet relocated) in the event the road were not. built.
I think I worked the hardest, and longest hours in my life that summer
to produce a report meeting these objectives. The effort was immeasurabl
aided, indeed would have not been possible, without the tireless, unpaid
work of a recent Tufts political science graduate, Dianne Wood, who
would later become a colleague at the Department of Public Works. Most
of the work was hard core data aggregation and analysis, dryly written
in a format that precisely followed legal and regulatory requirements
for assurance that housing would be available for all families to be
displaced. (See Chapter Two) In fact, the requirements could not be
met by action of the existing housing market, and this was documented
to the extent that any attempts to undo the work would have required as
much effort as we put into it - a not very likely occurrence under
forseen circumstances. It is perhaps most telling of the illusory
nature of such legal and regulatory provisions that, to my knowledge,
prior to BTPR, no official relocation plan in the history of urban
renewal or highway displacement (relocation plans had been required in
all federally aided projects for at least 8 years previous) had ever
shown anticipated housing resources to be deficient.
In addition to documentation of the housing market, the report
contained a detailed inventory, and analysis, of sites in the affected
neighborhoods on which replacement housing could be built. Existing
and innovative means to construct, finance, manage or dispose of the
housing were proposed. A cost benefit analysis was done which showed
the total cost of replacement housing (subsidized 40 years for low
income households) would be, at most, less than two per cent of gross
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project costs and probably would save money on the overall project tab
by recapture of escalation costs in construction because the families
would be moved sooner than otherwise possible. (See Chapter Four)
While the report on its merits was a satisfying technical accomplish-
ment and one which, I think, would have been useful in a litigants case,
there remained some interpersonal tactics to assure that the objectives
would be met. They were, briefly, as follows:
1) Repeated emphasis, persuasion, whatever, to BTPR staff that the
reports findings and proposals for replacement housing were to be
discussed at all public and agency meetings. In this way the conclusions
were circulated wider and in more simple form than the full written
report, which had, of necessity, become quite specific and technical.
I also delayed submitting the written report, or any summary version,
to BTPR management until last minute production of their overall
document, so there would be no time to edit or delete any portions.
2) Predictably, the anti-highway forces 'reacted by denouncing the
Replacement Housing Program as infeasible. The proposal was unprece-
dented in scope, and light years beyond the administrative capacity of
the Department of Public Works (an argument developed in other reports).
Advocates were urged, particularly through the broad sensibilities
of Chuck Turner and Fred S4lvucci,14 to appendix to their remarks some
statement that, in spite of its difficulty, the Replacement Housing
Program was the minimum that would be required under federal law. They
14. In public meetings, Salvucci had used the issue of low cost housing
being built in Hyde Park and Roslindale to parlay residents of those
neighborhoods against the road.
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agreed, and the issue largely bacame that the practical limitations
(incompetance) of the Department of Public Works made replacement housing
infeasible, but that the program was otherwise correct and necessary.
3) Briefed on the complexities of administering a build decision, and
aware of the criticism leveled against their agency, the Secretary of
Transportation and Commissioner of Public Works proposed legislation to
assure their legal authority to effectuate a replacement housing
program. The legislation was adopted. In addition, they promised to
create new positions within the Department of Public Works to assure
that staff skills would be present to carry out a complex relocation
and replacement housing program.
The Governor eventually decided not to build the Southwest Expressway.
Indeed, none of the unfinished highways in metro-Boston would continue.
He stated in a live, dramatic television broadcast that "quality of life
in Boston" was the basis for his decision, citing factors such as loss
of environmental resources, air, noise, traffic and parking congestion,
and disruption of families and neighborhoods. In subsequent conversation
Secretary of Transportation Alan Altshuler, who had favored building
the Southwest Expressway, noted these issues and others, including the
problem of an extremely difficult replacement housing program. The
dynamic surrounding this decision was a complex and fascinating one,
and I have touched on it from a limited perspective only.15
Working in BTPR provided opportunity for tactical lessons of the first
order. The influence that the process, and its decisions, have had on
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15. For a very thorough discussion, see Ralph Gakenheimer's Transportatic
Planning as Response to Controversy: The Boston Case, MIT Spring 1976
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transportation planning locally and nationally are vast, especially
regarding the reality of a no-build highway decision. Several books and
many Journal articles were written about it, and a number of careers
considerably advanced. Gains for objectives to change the politics
of relocation planning have been noted, chief among them the precedents
set for interpretation of legal and regulatory provisions, and the
weighting of impacts due to displacement among the components of a
project decision. The new positions proposed within the Department of
Public Works were created, and I was hired to direct relocation planning
efforts on other projects.
On the negative side, the rationality of BTPR's efforts towards
political consensus decision making, open discussion of issues, and
positive problem solving have not continued as smoothly or widespread
as hoped for, neither within Massachusetts transportation agencies, nor
even within metropolitan Boston. The problem of 100 families in poorly
maintained state owned property in the Southwest Corridor, remains yet
unresolved. The careers of former BTPR staff who remained in Massachu-
setts, in contrast to the smooth rise of most consultants who departed,
have been uneven. Reprisals in the form of contract payment delays, etc.
15
from the frustrated highway builders were not uncommon. The symbolic
effect had been devastating. (As one disgruntled Public Works official
put it: "Once you've been a pickle, you can never be a cucumber again.')
16. The appointment of me, Dianne Wood, and two others to the newly
created DPW positions was opposed by a petition of 900 employees, and
attempted litigation by the employees union.
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IV. The Park Plaza Renewal Controversy
After Frank Sargent's Acting Commissioner of Community Affairs,
William Richardson,17 had completed a brilliant technical analysis to
defeat developer Mortimer Zuckerman and the Boston Redevelopment
Authority's proposed $260 million Park Plaza Renewal Plan, he was
replaced by Miles Mahoney, former Philadelphia Housing Authority
Director. When Mahoney actually did veto the plan, using Richardson's
case, the Governor was marched upon by irate construction workers.
Supported by the Chamber of Commerce and others they cited Park Plaza
and no-highway decisions as antithetical to their interests. The
Mayor was also outraged, as the state had never before turned down a
Boston Renewal project. Under pressure from Sargent's aides, Mahoney
quit after disapproving the plan a second time, and the more
conciliatory Lewis Crampton took over. Crampton eventually approved
Park Plaza, subject to completion of environmental impact studies, which
is essentially where it stands now.
Zuckerman and his Urban Associates claimed to have a plan that would
redevelop Boston's Combat Zone, as well as the entire Park Square area,
with wholly private funds (proposed hotel, office space, luxury apart-
ments, specialty commercial, and a possible department store). To
accomplish this, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) would have to
displace, over a several year period, over 300 businesses and 200
families; provide guaranteed municipal bond financing of $150 million;
17. The former Deputy Commissioner who, in the Woburn Redevelopment
Authority story, had been branded the hater of white folk. He had
succeeded Leon Charkoudian.
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re-align streets and upgrade z:xisting infrastructure; and sign agreements
for limited taxation over the initial years of the development. Two
of a number of Urban Associates minor conditions Included final say
over the "Independently" determined appraisals for value of property
to be acquired, and payment of less than 70 per cent fair market value
pro tanto to properties acquired by eminent domain. (Federally aided
projects must pay 100 per cent of value pro tanto, which is the payment
legally required to be available shortly after the eminent domain taking,
and which can be drawn without prejudice to possible additional amounts
from equity litigation. Less than 100 per cent payment pro tanto is
de facto coercion to accept the acquiring agency's payment as final,
since the property is cleared under either condition.)
Although all but the last two provisions, and the amount of municipal
bond financing, are standard provisions to private developers of
government backed urban renewal, Zuckerman's plan had a more important
twist: his proposed agreement with the city did not bind him to
developing the Combat Zone, which as the only truly "blighted" area was
justification under state law for takings by eminent domain throughout
the project area. Instead, the city was to provide the rich, but
undeveloped portion of Park Square along Boylston Street (fronting the
Public Garden) between Arlington and Tremont Streets into Urban
Associates hand (essentially Zuckerman's personal holdings) as the first
stage effort and to finance the development with below market rate,
guaranteed municipal bonds. If this succeeded, Urban's agreement said
they would bid on development of the Combat Zone.
As can be gathered from this brief description, the issues were
it ________
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extremely complex, complicated by monumentally obtuse legal jargon in
Urban's proposed agreement with the city. Few, and hopefully none of
the BRA staff, initially understood the negative implications of
Zuckerman's plan. And he played his hand perfectly, garnering support
from the Mayor, the Director of the BRA, downtown merchants, construction
unions, architects, and lovers of downtown development, before anyone
knew what was going on. The architecture was exciting, highlighted by
a giant glassed pedestrian mall. Only a few environmental types,
concerned with shadows that would be cast on the Garden by the three
600 foot towers originally proposed (since scaled down), and those
who would be displaced, objected initially. These latter were considered
selfish "vested interests". The Globe ran an editorial endorsement of
this heroic private enterprise, "at a time when federal renewal funds
are no longer available."
The Department of Community Affairs veto, highly visible but
confusingly reported like all else on Park Plaza, had initiated the
critical examination which has continued, unresolved, since. For
weeks after DCA's action, the Globe would not print private citizen's
letters supporting the veto, and buried protesting organizations
like the Back Bay Civic Association and others' paid statements in
unnoticeable ad spaces. Coverage eventually leveled off, as the
impacts of the project began to surface.
My part in the Park Plaza controversy came as member of an ad hoc
committee of the Boston Society of Architects to review Park Plaza,
assembled by Peter Roudebush, former BTPR staffer and an architect
genuinely concerned with the shape of his city. This review occured
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about nine months after DCA's initial veto. Roudebush's connections
were impressive, including the Mayor and the BRA director, and with
their qualified endorsement in advance of the Society's review, put
together a working committee comprised of (besides my humble self),
a landscape architect; the president of the Architects Collaborative;
the head of the Boston Municipal Research Bureau; a senior partner in
Hale and Dorr; and K. Dunn Gifford, vice president and financial
analyst for Cabot, Cabot, and Forbes (and close friend of Ted Kennedy).
Gifford's part was to be the most controversial.
A final report, which elaborated on the issues mentioned and several
others (essentially corroborating DCA's findings), all carefully
presented in positive recommendations for change, was released
simultaneously to the BRA, DCA, and the Globe, a few days before DCA
Commissioner Crampton had been scheduled to decide on the revised BRA
submission we reviewed. Cramptan put off his decision, and the
Globe printed the recommendations on page two. Later the Globe
added thumbnail biographies and printed the Mayor's critical assessment
of potential interests each member of the committee and the firms they
worked for had in the project.
The Mayor described the architects on the committee as rivals of the
selected architects for Park Plaza (a New York firm), and charged that
they were responding out of jealousy for not being involved in the
development. But the worst was reserved for Gifford. Undoubtedly
the heaviest hitter in the group, Gifford's financial review showed
that Zuckerman's development was getting $70 million in subsidized
interest over the life of the low rate municipal bonds, and that the
2 R
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city would be liable for the developer's as well as their own failures
on account of this city backed financing. Gifford wondered why other
developers hadn't objected, since Zuckerman's favorable financing
and land costs would allow him to undercut the luxury housing and
commercial space markets.
In response, the Mayor showed the kind of tactics he can employ to
18
handle political enemies. First he noted that Gifford's firm,
Cabot, Cabot, and Forbes had been an unsuccessful bidder for Park Plaza
renewal, implying vindictiveness and conflict of interest. Privately,
he also suggested that Gifford may have been used by Ted Kennedy,
hardly the Mayor's best friend, to publicly embarrass him. When
Gifford wouldn't back down from his analysis or admit to conflict of
interest, White ordered the BRA to hold up zoning approval of Cabot,
Cabot, and Forbes' 60 State Street office building, presuming, I guess,
that the company would relent and apologize for or fire Gifford. The
stalemate continued over a year, until White allowed 60 State Street
to go ahead on the urging of local merchants, construction workers,
and his tax assessor, and close friend, Ted Anzalone.
This sort of tactical situation is quite different from the others
described, and beyond my normal experience. I offer it as contrast to
the kind of discussion which occurred in the comparatively open BTPR
forum, and to the thinly masked intentions of bureaucratic semantics
in everyday agency practice. Park Plaza seems destined to go ahead,
17. Earlier in the game, the Mayor had threatened to revoke the
East Boston liquor license of a DCA staff person's father. He had also
had his tax assessor revalue the properties of several businesses in
Park Square objecting to their displacement.
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but the precedents it may set for privately financed renewal will
less closely parallel the greed, irrationality, and back room politics
of earlier government backed efforts, thanks to the initial objections
of a small number of skillful and ardent skeptics. A number of public
hearings and reams of public and private debate have ensued.
Although some consessions have been made in the content of the plan,
the basic profits and political structure, unfortunately, remain
unchanged. Arguments that the displacement of Combat Zone entertainment
facilities would only spread the problem into the Chinese community,
Kenmore Square, and North Station, have not been considered significant.
Attempts to assure continuation of the existing retail businesses by
affording them special loans and favored occupancy in new construction,
or through self-initiated rehabilitation efforts, have not succeeded.
The net cost of the proposed construction to the city remains questionablc
considering the enormous investment required in supportive infrastructure
as well as the revenues foregone through favored municipal financing.
The Park Plaza controversy has also been an opportunity to observe
some high level integrity amongst certain government officials and
private citizens professionally concerned about public issues. I have
discussed only a few cases, there are many more involved. Whatever the
motivation, these were admirable to behold.
I;
Comment on Participation and Effect
A few general observations which hopefully flow from the case
discussions...
1) Throughout, implicit emphasis has been given to the "objective".
It can be argued that no one would (or should) be in the social change
business without objectives, but a clear objective has practical
advantages as well as providing moral justification. A clear objective
focuses cause and effect, and, like the control variable in a scientific
experiment, allows behavior to be measured. This measuring of behavior,
of one's effort and effect, is part of the way events, internal and
external, need to be structured in order to be grasped. This structurin
can take more and more precise form as the objective is more clearly
delineated. Although the best political (and socially responsible)
thinking re-examines objectives as well as all other variables, those
with particular objectives for their tasks have, at the very least,
analytical. advantage for effecting some social change.
2) The perspective of an involved technician, professional or whatever,
has underlaid the discussion. This was the one I have had and continue
to maintain. By focusing on tactics from this point of view, I hope
to have made some incremental dent in the mythology (or self protective
exclusion) many planners and other professionals maintain about their
a-political stature. However technical one's position may seem to be,
it must also be realized for its political effect.
Far too little attention is paid by most professionals to their
social responsibilities, at least in terms of tactical potential in
a particular situation. By denying a direct role in the political
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process they who dissent become moot actors with unimportan~t vagaries,
or tools of the more politically astute.
For technicians who would practice tactics for change, knowledge of
one's limits and potentialities in a particular role at a particular
point in time is crucial. This can only be obtained by continually
re-examining political effects of the knowledge applied. Few
professionals evaluate their work in this way.
3) One must be careful to distinguish personal gain. The system has
18
self-corrective features for those identified with social change,
which serves to limit the opportunities to effect change in a
particular area. Anonymity is best. Identification brings notoriety
which in turn allows opposition to focus and become more refined with
the experience of the encounter. When the opposition outnumbers out,
odds build up on the other side. It seems best, therefore, to play
oneself down following gains made at the other side's expense, and it
may be far more effective for someone else.to take credit for your
best work. Part of the task is always to add supporters, even in spite
of themselves.
18. Aristotle had a basic fear of personal political power, especially
among professionals. He also argued that majorities always need to
see things in equilibrium.
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AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY IN TERSPECTIVE
Introduction
An analytic method, whose goal is to make the planning and implementatica
of public projects more rational and responsive to those affected, must
first of all find a place in the decision-making process. The Metho-
dology described in this chapter has been used by the Massachusetts
Department of Public Works since January, 1973, during which time it
has been applied on over 60 separate projects involving the displacement
of families and businesses. Many of the household, business, neighbor-
hood and housing market evaluation techniques were developed and tested
in the broadly participant Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR),
which the author was involved in between August, 1971, and October, 1972.
The BTPR reports mentioned in the previous chapter were prepared using
methods substantially similar to these about to be discussed. The
methodology was continuously refined through the fall of 1975, when
myself and co-author Dianne Wood left employ of the Public Works
Department. The most major changes we made were in efforts to improve
the participation of affected households and businesses, while
bureaucratic factors account for several minor revisions.
A major difficulty of public project decision-making has been the
mis application of vague generalizations about impacts. All too often
technical views of a problem rest on the judgment of persons whose
deliberations are unobservable and hence unscrutinizable. Common bases
for evaluation are avoided so that decisions can seem technically
correct, notwithstanding the wholly unanalytical and programmed opinions
of public officials and their hired "experts". As a result, many
106
wasteful public projects have gone ahead, while even the worthwhile
ones have produced unnecessarily bad effects. The problem of openness
in decision-making is especially acute where there are possible adverse
effects on relatively powerless interests. By requiring adherence to
rational analytic method that will show, to those affected, the real
impacts of the project, an impact assessment methodology would hope to
make the deliberations of public officials more accountable, and the
projects better serving of their constituents.
I. Background
A. Purpose
A methodology for assessing the impacts of public actions which
displace households and businesses has been applied in the form of
guidelines for public agency staff or consultants charged with preparing
environmental impact and related statements. A written product for use
in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required as well as
adherence to a method of work that includes public and agency contacts
and technical applications beyond the written report. (section II.D.)
Although the guidelines specifically refer to highway projects,
the techniques used are applicable to any project involving displacement.
Review of past environmental impact statements had revealed that
vague, unsubstantiated generalizations were being provided as "analysis
of impacts due to displacement". No attempts had been made to
investigate characteristics of the particular households and
businesses potentially displaced, nor the behavior of local housing
and commercial markets. Even the numbers of displacement were rough
estimates, sometimes garnered from outdated photogrametric surveys.
107
Most often conclusions were drawn that "relocation poses no significant
problem". Surely displacement impacts were not a factor in the choice
of design or location alternatives, except in tendencies to sometimes
reduce numbers and to acquire cheaper properties in lieu of more
expensive ones. The amount of lead time necessary to carry out
relocation programs was not calculated in the setting of construction
timetables. Construction costs tended to be underestimated, and
hence benefit-cost ratios appeared disproportionately high.
The implicit, as well as explicit, requirements of an EIS were
not being met. There were not contacts attempted with potentially
displaced households and businesses and thus little opportunity to
learn of possible relocation difficulties through the public
participation mechanism. (section III. F.) In summary, the chief
implications of failure to examine impacts due to displacement through
public involvement and/or technical analysis, were a) that potential
relocatees were denied consideration in project decisions, and
b) that problems, which might have been avoided entirely or for which
remedial measures could have been programmed early, would surface at
a time late in the process when construction was being pressed. Delays
at this point could mean, in addition to unanticipated construction
costs escalation, failure of the state to meet contract clearance
dates and thus expensive litigation from contractors, and worst of all,
extreme pressure being applied to force households and businesses to
move as quickly as possible.
Guidelines for work on environmental impact statements, prepared
and administered by a newly created Relocation Planning Section within
the Massachusetts Department of Public Works, were introduced to
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resolve some of these problems. Specific objectives were stated as
followsl
To assure consideration of relocation problems in
location and design work, so that changes in alignments
may be effected in early stages of project development
when it appears severe relocation impacts or problems
could be avoided by such modifications.
To assure that impacts due to relocation will be
presented for each alternate being considered in
Location and Environmental Impact Studies, and that
such impacts will be a factor in deciding final
alternatives.
To assure that potential relocation problems will
be identified as early as possible, so that more
adequate lead time will be allowed the Right of Way
Bureau to resolve problems requiring special action.
The development of possible solutions must begin early
in the process, particularly where replacement housing
measures may be necessary. 1
B. Scope of Technical Analysis
The methodology includes analysis of the following categories of
impact:
1) On households to be displaced, by type of household. Effects on
minorities, the elderly, large families, female-headed, and low income
households are considered to be especially critical. (Section III.B.)
2) On housing, by type, cost , size, and location. Difficulties in
replacing particular kinds of housing in particular areas, and effects
of the loss of -housing resources. (Section III.D.)
3) On businesses, by type of business. Difficulties in finding suit-
able and affordable replacement locations, disruption causing loss of
business, and effects on the local economy, especially jobs. (Sec-
iMemo from F. Mahady, Supervisor of Relocation Planning to Right of
Way Bureau Director, Mass. DPW, June 6, 1973. The guidelines were
written by myself and Dianne T. Wood, Relocation Specialist, Mass. DPW.
I
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tion III.B.)
4) On neighborhoods, in which displacement occurs and to which reloc-
ation may be made. Evaluation of neighborhood characteristics which
appear important to the needs and prcferences of households and busi-
nesses to be displaced. Divisive and disruptive effects of the facility
itself, and the process leading to its realization. (Section III.C.)
5) On remedial programs and project timing. A description and eval-
uation of actions to remedy insufficient relocation resources, including,
if 4ecessary, replacement housing of last resort, and an estimate of
the amount of lead time required to relocate all occupants. (Section
III.E.)
The analysis of impacts is done for each alternative carried in the
EIS. Where an alternative is dismissed in the EIS for reasons of com-
pelling impact in other areas, such as excessive ecological disruption,
inadequate travel time savings or other cost inefficiencies, etc., the
treatment of relocation impacts may be less detailed than in "live" op-
tions.
A series of contacts with affected businesses, realtors, local offi-
cials, agencies, and community groups are essential provisions of the
methodology. A meeting with all households and businesses potentially
displaced by the alternatives under consideration is required to be
held prior to formal public hearings. This meeting, which is in addition
to general public informational meetings held during EIS preparation,
is a forum to answer questions about the process and to exchange infor-
mation about the project's impacts. It is considered as well an invi-
tation to more effective participation on the part of potential reloca-
tees and a test of the technical findings. (Section III.F)
C. Criteria for Evaluation
Section II is a discussion of constraints experienced in the develop-
ment and implementation of an impact assessment methodology. The prin-
cipal critique implicit here is whether the restrictions have been pro-
perly addressed. Has the methodology been an effective response? If not,
have the best tactics been used to overcome limitations?
Section III is an examination of techniques applied to the measurement,
evaluation, and presentation of impacts. The methods applied must ans-
wer questions such as: are the measurements the proper indicator of im-
pacts? Are factors correlated to express the problem in clear terms,
susceptible to application in decisions about proje::t alternatives and
the design of remedial programs? Does the information indeed have an
influence on the project--how do final program decisions result from
the analysis performed and what effect is had on eventual program im-
plementation?
The methodology must be tested with strict evaluation by the above
criteria. To aid the task something of a running critique is provided
where, in the author's judgment, particular difficulties are apparent.
Examples of the techniques in practice are offered throughout. txper-
ience in relocation teaches a language of housing markets whose seman-
tics often appear different from those in traditional economic theories.
The section is 4ot a critique of current economists' explanations nor
does it present comparative hypotheses, but perhaps some issues will be
raised that demand more systematic investigation along appropriate
theoretical lines.
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II. Constraints to an Impact Assessment Methodology
A. Legal and Administrative Requirements
The principal impetus for a methodology to assess the impacts of a
public project on persons to be displaced has been the Federal Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisitin Policies Act of 1970. The
statute provides that comparable decent, safe, and sanitary replacement
housing must be available within the finzncial means of households to be
displaced by a federally-aided project. If sufficient suitable housing
cannot be made available through existing resources, then housing must
be built as necessary. Massachusetts state law contains provisions
identical to the Uniform Act. Federal courts have determined that
appropriate steps must be taken in the planning stages of a project to
assure that relocation programs fulfill the intentions of the statute.
(see Chapter Two).
The Uniform Act also stipulates that the heads of federal agencies
prescribe regulations to define "comparabie replace~ment housing" and
other provisions of the statute. Unfortunately, regulatory standards
differ among the various federal agencies, on such crucial items as
dwelling and neighborhood comparability and financial means, etc., in
spite of efforts to resolve them within Joint Regional Councils
throughout the country and central committees in Washington. Moreover,
even where apparently clear criteria are provided in a particular fed-
eral agency's regulations, there are often vast differences of inter-
pretation among state implementing agencies, and the local, regional,
and Washington offices of the-federal funding agencies. (see Section
II.E) One hoped-for objective of our methodology, therefore, is that
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it not be susceptible to changing interpretations and that, although
structured in terms of existing legal and regulatory requirements, it be
able to stand on its own as adequate technical analysis.
In addition to laws and regulations particular to relocation, pro-
visions of Title 23, U.S. Code, regarding the preparation of environmen-
tal impact and related statements (part 771), require discussion of im-
pacts due to displacement. These provisions are largely an outline of
Massachusetts guidelines, which had been in effect and were submitted
to the federal Department of Transportation prior to promulgation of its
revised regulations . The new federal regulations have greatly increased
former requirements of the EIS on relocation matters. Although the
national EIS guidelines only list factors to be considered and do not
expand upon techniques for application, this step, in its implications
for the work of other states, has been one of the more satisfying ex-
tensions of the methodology to date.
B. Costs
The methodology is included in the Standard Provisions for Consultant
Services on all Massachusetts DPW EIS contracts. Costs have ranged from
$5-25,000 (labor plus overhead and expenses) thus far, depending upon
the type and magnitude of relocation contemplated in a particular pro-
ject and the number of alternatives to be considered. With environ-
mental impact statements typically costing in the range of $150,000 to
$500,000 overall, the cost of the relocation studies has been insigni-
ficant. And this for an impact to which the public may be especially
sensitive.
The efficiency of the methodology can be measured in ways other than
by comparison to the total EIS budget. When compared to expenditures
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required for acquisition and relocation payments should a project go
ahead, for example, planning costs appear especially marginal. The sup-
plemental relocation payment to one homeowner may easily be $15,000, which
is in addition to fair market value paid for the dwelling. One such re-
location saved by more careful planning more than makes up the cost of
an entire study (in relocation accounting terms). There have been a
number of examples of this. Moreover, if the planning reveals problems
which could have caused delays in implementing the project, and if the
problems can be avoided by an alternative which does not cause such
delay or solved prior to the critical time, then savings will be real-
ized in construction costs due to escalation. On a $6,000,0000 pro-
ject, construction costs are estimated to be $1600 more each day the
job is not completed. The state was charged $25,000 per week for con-
struction cost overruns on a major project in 1974, when a badly
planned business move (planning for the project had been done several
years ago) was not completed in accordance with right of way clear-
ance agreements. There have been many other examples. 2
One final note on costs: even the most glamorous relocation programs
will usually be a small proportion of total project costs. A good ex-
ample is a replacement housing program planned for the now defunct
Southwest Expressway in Boston. The program called for 250-300 units of
2 1t is also obvious that the computed cost/benefit ratios on some
past projects have been unrealistically high, because in failing to ac-
count for delays, such as those due to poor relocation planning, capital
costs were estimated too low and benefits too high. This is not an aca-
demic point--justification must be provided over a specific period (10-
25 years depending on type of project) and highway cost/benefit analysis
is highly sensitive to time. Travel time savings (the chief measure of
benefits) diminish as a road becomes more congested (which can happen
rapidly). Service benefits today may not exist two years from now.
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new single family and duplex homes to be constructed on sca+tered sites
in the affected neighborhoods. For over half of these units lifetime
subsidies were calculated on behalf of low income households, (a benefit
not possible under current FHWA administrative policy) many of whom
could afford less than one-fifth of market capital and carrying costs.
Cost to the government (entirely from highway user tax revenues) of this
most ambitious replacement housing program would have been less than
3 per cent of. the capital outlay required for an eleven mile stretch of
four lane urban freeway.3 The calculation did not include possible
savings in construction costs escalation, even though the families
could not have been moved without replacement housing. It is likely
that on most urban highways, a well-planned and executed relocation
and replacement housing program will actually save in overall project
costs.
C. Timing
In order to effect project choices, findings on relocation impacts
must be available while alternatives are still being developed. This
means that the relocation analysis cannot lag behind other impact
assessments. As engineering becomes more refined, it is progressively
harder to change.
Some have seen something of a dilemma here, arguing that impacts are
not known until precise engineering is completed. In actuality, this is
the exception rather than the rule. A 200' scale engineering plan, which
3. See Boston Transportation Planning Review, Southwest Report, FHWA-
Mass-EIS-72-29-D, Sept. 1972
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is developed for each alternative very early, shows displacements which
vary only slightly on more refined scales. Moreover, as soon as a line
is drawn, impacts can be measured and described in accordance with the
precision of the line. Where there is uncertainty as to the number of
or particular displacements that may occur, or as to the physical
configuration of the facility, impacts can be stated as a range and
can be based on the possible design alternatives. This is an analytical
parameter for all impact assessments, relocation is no exception and
presents, to the careful technician, no more difficulties than in any
other impact area. Unfortunately, there is a tendency among highway
builders to want to play down displacement impacts, particularly numbers,
as they are seen to agitate public opposition. But in a process
increasingly open to public participation, a much more serious concern
is credibility, and impacts that were seen to increase over time would
be anathema. Furthermore, nothing is gained when impacts whicn might
have been avoided become a problem later on. The straightforward and
best answer is to show the public engineering to whatever level of
detail it is developed, and to discuss impacts accordingly. This is an
explicit requirement of Massachusetts guidelines, and it has indeed
aided projects' credibility as well as fulfilling objectives to surface
possible relocation problems early.
The guidelines also provide that consultants maintain continuous
contact with the Relocation Planning Section of DPW, so that their
application of relocation findings to project engineering may be monitored
D. Consultant Skills and Objectives
It is not in the nature of most consultants to raise problems to the
agency which hires them (except about payment). The substance of an
EIS is quickly forgotten once a project is approved, while the process
lingers for agency officials through impressions of cooperation,
conciliation, and the overall smoothness by which the product was
achieved. Since highway agencies which pay the consultant to produce an
EIS are, by and large, dominated-by a mentality that would play down
impacts, consultants have a tendency to rush to the conclusion that there
are no problems - in spite of efforts to convince them through explicit
statements in the guidelines and personal exhortations that such tendencie.
in relocation matters anyway are counterproductive. There are numerous
examples of conclusions drawn in consultant submissions which are
contradictory to the technical analysis developed. Another reason for
this is that when problems are acknowledged, additional work is
required, for example in finding possible sites for replacement housing.
When a consultant has poorly timed the work effort, and is pressured by
other factions within the agency to produce a draft EIS as quickly as
possible (almost always the case), then additional efforts on an item
of relocation may be problematic. Many transportation planning
consultants, accustomed to regional scale perspectives, have been found
to lack experience in the localized kind of analysis called for in
relocation planning.
As a result of these problems, the guidelines require that the.
consultant submit a draft relocation report to the Relocation Planning
Section prior to submission of an overall preliminary draft EIS to the
agency. The Relocation Planning Section also retains responsibility for
conclusions that will be presented in the EIS, and is responsible for
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preparing a Summary Findings of the consultant's report for inclusion
in the EIS. Submission of a Conceptual Stage Relocation Program Plan
is also required by federal regulations (PPM 81-1, par. 12) to be made
under separate cover from the EIS, prior to Corridor Public Hearings.
Requirements of the Conceptual Stage Plan are met by the guidelines,
and the product is the same as the EIS except that more confidential
information may be included. (Any potentially confidential information
such as values estimated for particular homes, estimated occupations
and incomes of particular households, etc., are deleted from the EIS)
While the above procedure is not foolproof, it does allow agency staff
to hold consultants responsible for the timing of their submission.
E. Bureaucratic Factors
A number of limitations to implementation of the methodology which
appeared over time, are generalizable as inherent constraints within
the involved agencies:
1) Agency officials may become fixed in their orientation to a problem.
Planning of the kind called for in the guidelines was a revolutionary
concept to some, who in past right-of-way clearance and relocation
programs made no input to the development of a project. They had
become accustomed to respond to crises at a much later stage in the
process, and when such crises are largely imposed externally. Problems
raised from within, and on paper, didn't seem quite real.
2) Agency officials may also become fixed in their orientation to a
job, such that any change or innovation is opposed.. Unlike factor 1),
which may be said to be caused by lack of breadth in experience, this
generalized resistence occurs largely out of feared loss of control.
______________ It It
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Familiarity with particular forms of control breeds contentment out of
one's ability to do the "required" job. When requirements of the job
threaten to change, or change too rapidly, the equilibrium is upset, and
initial reaction is to try re-setting to the former requirements. This
tendency is likely to continue for some time. Indeed, in spite of
repeated success over three years, the methodology is still not accepted
by some officials of the state Department of Public Works and Federal
Highway Administration. Some have repeatedly attempted to eliminate
certain provisions of the guidelines (by insisting that they are not
"required" by regulations) which, if lacking, would make the whole
illogical. It may be said that they simply do not understand what the
guidelines are about, or else have purposely attempted to render them
unworkable. In contrast, some more ambitious officials have picked up
on the new wave and are stumping relocation planning as their own
innovation. This latter type of behavior is to be encouraged, and
tactics to do so are continually applied. Pride in authorship is
counterproductive.
3) Agency officials have applied too general or too restrictive
interpretations of statutory and regulatory provisions, to the extent
that overall objectives of the program may be frustrated. This occurs
partly because responsibilities are structured along purely functional
lines, within Federal and State highway agencies. Right-of-Way
personnel are not concerned with design or engineering problems and vice
versa. There is little incentive to achieve "horizontal" integration,
or the meshing of goals and objectives between disciplines. As a result,
practices which may be beneficial, for example, to the agency's general
II: ________
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public image and to expeditious completion of a project, may be opposed
by officials within the discipline because of reactions similar to
1) or 2) above, or because they perceive implications that would be
difficult to manage as a general rule. Particular projects become ham-
strung in this way. A recent example of this phenomenon occured in a
high priority Interstate project in Massachusetts. Right of Way officials
in the Federal Highway Administration opposed the state's plan to provide
last resort replacement housing to a displaced tenant family because it
provided them homeownership, which they felt would set a bad precedent.
This in spite of the state's case that homeownership was permitted
under statute and regulations (never disputed, nor even responded to),
and that the state had no other legal recourse (they did not dispute
this but asked for a ruling of the Attorney General who at the time was
an active political opponent of the incumbent Governor), and, most
significantly, delayed approval in spite of the wholehearted support
of the state's Chief Engineer and the local FHWA Division Engineer who
agreed it to be the best solution for the overall project. The
bureaucrats did not relent until the state provided documentation that
the proposed plan was the most economical one, in right-of-way
accounting terms. Meanwhile, the cost of the overall project had risen
due to escalation in construction, the incremental dollar amount being
six times that of the cost of the proposed last resort housing program.
Two months prior to this debacle, personnel from Washington FHWA had
urged the state to "be innovative" in their application of last resort
housing, and stated unequivocally that they would approve any plan that
complied with the regulations. In effect, they invented new regulations
H_1 I
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to attempt to thwart the state's plan.
Another reason for regressive bureaucratic practice may be the lack of
public contact that most federal agency officials maintain, although
shoddy practices by state agents in the field suggest this may not be
an overwhelming factor. Certain bureaucrats' view of the problem is a
paper one only, and they may be insensitive to aspects of relocation
(even the highway program overall) that become poignant only by contact
with the people invol-ved.
In many instances, regulations are not taken seriously by the state or
federal reviewing agencies, and relocatees may be denied the full
protections provided. I remember several instances where the Federal
Highway Administration Division Realty Officer suggested that the state
delete references in their relocation plan to a need for last resort
housing, lest "we become committed to something we're not sure we need."
This in spite of unrefuted Lechnical analysis supporting the need for
housing. On one major project, false and misleading information was
encouraged by this same FHWA official and submitted by the state's Right
of Way Bureau Director as the relocation plan (over the Relocation
Planning Section's vociferous protestations and questions in support of
the objections by the state's Chief Engineer). Unfortunately, there
have been many relocation plans in the history of highway and renewal
projects that were nothing more than trumped-up displays of non-existent
housing resources, encouraged by the supposedly protective federal review
bureaucracies as well as state implementing ones. In addition to
subverting the law, such actions in the long run intimidate further an
already suspicious public. The clamor of opposition to many highway
______________ 
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and renewal projects, and delays in executing approved projects, is
largely a consequence of this kind of shortsighted malpractice.
4) The guidelines for assessing impacts due to -displacement provide for
explicit technical analysis to be carried out in a prescribed manner of
work. Both these aspects are lacking in almost all other areas of
impact assessment, particularly in the social and economic areas. For
this reason alone, namely that the methodology is somehow out of synch,
some administrators of the EIS process have objected to the guidelines
on such grounds as "too detailed", "too complicated", "unnecessarily
precise". It's hard to respond to this kind of argument, (without a
lot of shouting and screaming), except to point out that, in fact, the
work is being done smoothly, cheaply, and is passing required reviews.
There are many other bureaucratic factors, some more than minor
technicalities, and all to be faced on a day to day basis. Those
described above deserve much more detailed elaboration than is possible
here, and indeed are better described by others in lengthy systemic
evaluations.4
One final note, and one which may not be peculiar to government
bureaucracies and which is difficult to reconcile under any circumstances.
Personal recriminations, whether or not imposed by the structure, are an
effective device to thwart change. Anyone wishing to carry ideas into
the machinery of agency practice, or government generally, must be
4. See for example: Downs, A. Inside Bureaucracy (Little Brown, 1967);
Rourke, F. Bureaucratic Power in National Politics (Little Brown, 1965);
Tullock, G. The Politics of Bureaucracy_ (Public Affairs Press, 1965);
Crozier, G. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Cambridge, 1970).
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prepared to accept, without paranoia or self-rebuke, personal affronts
and much scheming to protect the most minor power relations that might
be altered. One advantage of a methodology such as the one developed
for relocation planning is that it has an established format requiring
written products. The rule of bureaucracy is that written products
need other written products to be challenged. The worst arguments,
common in oral discussion, are usually kept out of use this way. And
when irrational points are committed to writing, one can at least
respond to particulars.
F. Readability
Reports prepared as a simple, clear narrative, digestible by the
general public have several advantages. For one, they are easier to read
and thus have greater potential to influence decisions. A logic which
is clear, and well documented, works best. Short reports are generally
better than long ones. Another benefit of simplified writing is that
it forces the technician to re-examine his or her own use of jargon, and
thus test the clarity of underlying assumptions. Technical analysis
can become sloppy and innovation numbed by slipping into too many
shorthand notations.
III. Techniques for Impact Analysis
The following discusses provisions for the technical analysis of
impacts. The appendix to this paper is a reproduction of the guidelines
and contains the data requirements. Beginning on page 3 of the guidelines,
subject headings are the same as those in this section. Please refer to
the appropriate section of the guidelines before proceeding with the
narrative, which will focus on the usefulness of the data and provide
123
some examples of application.
A. Inventory of structures, dwelling units, commercial establishments
and farms
While an inventory of affected structures, households, and businesses
seems obvious, even this amount of information was not being obtained
prior to the guidelines. As noted in the Background section, outdated
aerial photogrametric surveys had frequently been used, with the result
that structures were missed or incorrectly identified to be residential
or business. Moreover, households and businesses would not know whether
or not they were affected, and thus could be excluded from effective
participation in the EIS review. An example of how crucial application
of this simple information can be occured in study of the now defunct
Southwest Expressway (1-95) in Boston. Detailed inventory revealed a
much larger number of families to be displaced than had ever previously
been reported. This information, together with analysis of household
characteristics and housing market resources, helped swing eventual
decisions not to build the road. On the same project, mistabulated
business displacements caused considerable reaction from public and
agency participants who felt that the analysts were purposely
misleading them.
B. Description of households and businesses affected, preliminary
identification of relocation needs and resources
At present, the description of households must be gathered almost
entirely from secondary sources. Federal officials frown on household
interviews at this stage of the process, arguing that they would cause
unnecessary disruption (see III. F.). Consultants could not be adequately
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trained in the relatively short period of their EIS involvement to
conduct proper interviews, while agency staff resources are limited.
However, the secondary sources described in the guidelines have thus far
provided excellent information, which when properly abstracted produces
a picture of households that is largely verified in the personal
interviews conducted later in the process.
Census rents and home values need to be adjusted to current rates.
Incomes, particularly in older urban areas, are remarkably stable, as are
the proportions of elderly, female-headed, large family, and individual
households estimated to be present. Even in areas with fairly rapid
turnover, the new residents appear characteristically similar to the old
when this preliminary information is checked against subsequent
interviews.
Exceptions to these rules occur in neighborhoods undergoing racial
change, and within the right of way itself when a project has been
long delayed. Predictably, change under such circumstances is in the
direction of more female-headed, large family, individual, and low
income households. The elderly are generally last to leave a neighborhood
(although the first to relocate after public acquisition), so that in
areas of increasing vacancies, proportions of elderly households may
actually rise. Also, there are more tenants of single family homes
within the right of way, by a large proportion compared to community
averages (often, such single family homes are owned by large real
estate interests who speculate that the state will pay more than it cost
them to buy from an uncertain, or desperate owner occupant). Rents in
these single family homes tend to be substantially lower than rents for
________ 
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comparable dwellings elsewhere, although apartment rentals may not be
depressed in a family or ethnically knit neighborhood or where overall
housing resources are scarce.
Since landlords generally are reluctant to rent to minorities,
female-headed households and to large families, and since affordable
resources are scarce for elderly 'and other low income households,
special attention is paid to these categories of affected occupants.
Lengths of residence and proportions of owner occupants in multiple unit
structures are commonly indicators of attachment to the particular home,
and usually to the particular neighborhood. Likewise, the presence of
related households, the incidence of paid-off mortgages, and number of
persons within walking distance to work, and the number of households
without automobiles indicate, when proportions are higher than community
averages, that the affected residents and the neighborhood overall may
be especially disrupted by acquisition and relocation. (see following
section)
Arguments on relocation difficulties derived from analysis of household
characteristics have been effectively used to demolish, in Massachusetts
anyway, the former mythology of highway designers that acquisition of
low valued homes (which correlates highly with problem households) was
the best, and cheapest course to pursue. Even some of the most
conservative engineers and planners now would prefer to see their
highway line through a $45,OOO home than risk displacing the low income
tenants of a less expensive dwelling. The latter is a scarcer resource.
Although not advocated as such, and although federal officials and some
state ones still prefer to see relocation as a chance to "upgrade"
Ii ________________________
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families (by forcing them into higher cost and more homogeneous
neighborhoods), the taking of more expensive dwellings can be a cost
effective approach (fewer delays, lower replacement costs) as well as
the one that will cause less disruption. Most higher income households
have more choices, appear in general to be less attached to a particular
neighborhood (part of their success may in fact be due to willingness
to move for example in changing jobs), and although they may raise the
most political eyebrows against their displacement, have an easier time
with relocation than most poorer households. Part of this is their
ability, on account of education, political connections, or legal
resources, to deal more effectively with the bureaucracy.
Similarly, it may be wisest to avoid displacing poorer business
establishments. The taking of a marginally operative business may
result in its going out of business entirely due to the higher costs of
operation in a new location, or from loss of business due to relocation.
Some may be looking for reasons to close down, and displacement by
puablic action may be the perfect excuse that also saves face in the
community. Westinghouse Sturdyvent Division in Hyde Park, an employer
of 3,000 persons,would have been an example of this if the Southwest
Expressway had been built. Once lost, such businesses, and jobs, may
never be regained, particularly in the inner city with declining rates
of entry.
Architects and engineers seem to have a bias for taking ugly structures,
which is frequently the description of urban low overhead business
operations, and the result on many occasions has been absolute loss
of jobs in a community and reduction of multipliers within segments
127
of the local economy. One example may illustrate the concern: 3,000
jobs (many of the higher paying manufacturing variety) were displaced
from Roxbury and Jamaica Plain by the initial takings for the Southwest
Expressway-Inner Belt. A relatively high proportion of the jobs were
held by minority community residents. In three years of attempts, the
Roxbury CDC replaced (tentatively) a total of 24 jobs (half to minorities)
in the same area.
Job loss, of course, is not the only adverse effect of unsuccessful
business relocation, or dislocation from the community. Tax revenues
to the municipality are foregone. Where the business has linkages to
local suppliers, distributers, or retailers, displacement of one may
mean reduced volumae for others, with attendant additional loss of jobs,
disposable income for other expenditures, and tax yields. (Population
loss from residential displacement has similar effects, particularly
on retail trade.) The Roxbury Crossing area of Boston's Southwest
Expressway corridor had been a regional center for the hardware
industry. Displacement of key manufacturers prompted many related
businesses to leave the city as well. As noted, replacement of inner
city businesses may be extremely difficult, or impossible. And the
relatively high cost of land, infrastructure, and other services, as
well as the negative investment psychology prevailing in a depressed
environment, discourages new enterprises from locating in areas cleared
of their original occupants. The enormous difficulties encountered in
attracting business to the cleared land in the Southwest Corridor,
despite public land and tax subsidies, are testament to the concern.
An example of more rational planning for business relocation has been
Hi M___
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taking place in Peabody and Salem for a proposed connector road there
(see Mass. D.P.W., Peabody/Salem Task B, EIS, June 1975). A number
of firms with special location, service, and utility requirements are
affected. Staff and consultants to the Mass. D.P.W., together with
local officials and all the impacted business-persons, have developed
an elaborate scheme involving land trades, access road construction,
and partial replacement of structures, to avoid the loss of business
and jobs in those communities. Unfortunately, Federal law and regulations
now only explicitly provide public expenditures for the actual costs
of a business move (loss of business, goodwill, etc. are not compensable),
and does not guarantee, as for families, that a suitable replacement
location must be found. Analysis of the plan shows that the cost in
public funds to implement this business-saving program would be less
than payments for relocation, not to mention retention in the local
communities of jobs and tax revenues. Moreover, legal briefs have
been prepared showing that the contemplated actions violate no provisions
of state and federal law or regulations. However, the proposal is
sharply opposed by officials of the Federal Highway Administration (see
previous discussion of Bureaucratic Factors, II. E.).
C. Neighborhood Characteristics
In addition to those variables discussed under household descriptions,
other neighborhood characteristics are important indicators of impact.
Relocation to "an equal or better neighborhood" is required by federal
regulations, although no social criteria (comparability in public and
commercial services and facilities is explicitly required) are offered
for determining what is equal or better. There is also a strong
____ 
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resistance among agency officials to allow any further definition, as
most are sensitive only to physical characteristics of neighborhoods,
such as density and condition of structures. (see Chapter Two) Arguments
that a particular neighterhood offers social advantages to its residents
usually fell on deaf ears. There have also been no court actions that
have set precedents for the general consideration of neighborhood
characteristics. Nevertheless, there have been cases where for example
public housing is ruled out as a potential resource because crime rates
and social conditions overall are perceived to be worse than in the
affected neighborhoods. Moreover, structure comparability is strictly
adhered to, so that residents of a neighborhood with two and three family
dwellings would not be expected to move to a neighborhood of high rise
multiple unit structures.
Striking demographic distinctions, and the presence of particular
resources such as regional recreation facilities, etc., may then be used
to -bolster the more accepted arguments in showing that only certain
neighborhoods will be acceptable for relocation. Unfortunately,
household preferences are not considered by the Federal Highway Admin-
istration as adequate justification for rating neighborhoods equal
or better. They insist that "we provide for needs, not desires."
This notion necessitates an objective methodology for evaluating
neighborhoods. The situation is ironic since almost all households
will move to their particular neighborhood of preference (in urban
areas, usually the one lived in or an adjacent one further away from
the inner city), unless choices there are lacking.
An example of the guidelines being applied to a neighborhood with
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particularly distinct physical and social characteristics, was a study
of proposed new off-ramps from the Tobin Bridge in Charlestown. The
potentially affected residents occupied homes that were more spacious
and less costly than anything comparable available, in Charlestown or
elsewhere. Federalist period brownstones had been purchased and
maintained (due to low assessments) by owner occupants at one-sixth
the cost of comparable structures in Beacon Hill or the South End. Median
rents -were 20 per cent lower than in Boston overall, and 100 per cent
lower than those in comparable structures. In the neighborhood comprising
the proposed takings, 34 per cent of households with income below the
poverty level owned their own home, compared to 5 per cent in Boston
overall. Thirty five per cent of households with incomes below $5,000
per year paid 25 per cent or less of their income for housing, compared
to only 10 per cent of overall Boston households in the same income
category paying less than 25 per cent. Only a minute proportion of units
lacked plumbing facilities, less than in overall Boston, while inspectors
rated general housing condition as excellent. The average length of
residence in Charlestown was thirty per cent longer than Boston residents
overall, and longer than any other Boston neighborhood. Fewer households
move every two years or less than in other Boston neighborhoods
(thirty per cent fewer than Boston overall), and proportionally more
persons have lived in the same house 20 years or more (40 per cent
more than in overall Boston). Charlestown was the only Boston
neighborhood affected by urban renewal that did not suffer a drop in
the proportion of owner occupants remaining. In terms of inexpensive
cost, desirable structure type, and neighborhood stability, Charlestown
Ii
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was unmatched by other Boston neighborhoods. 5
A conclusion was drawn that Charlestown, and particularly that
section where the affected occupants lived, offered advantages not
found in other Boston neighborhoods, and therefore residents would
have to be relocated within their own neighborhood to meet "equal or
better neighborhood" requirements. However, housing resources and
vacant land on which to build were inadequate. The technical case was
immeasurably aided (indeed, dwarfed) by a petition of 10,000 Charlestown
residents protesting any displacement, and the proposed ramps were
dropped from consideration.
Planning researchers have spent considerable energies in recent years
trying to categorize urban neighborhoods. There seems to be particular
fascination for determining "neighborhood cohesiveness", and to define
it in terms of certain social interactions, such as contact with
neighbors, friends, relatives, community groups, etc. Those neighborhoods
which exhibit such characteristics are presumed to be the most ideal, and
thus to be avoided by public actions which may disrupt such relationships.
Surely socially interactive neighborhoods should not be imposed upon,
but classifications along these lines may be misleading, or too narrow
an interpretation of neighborhood quality. Our experience in relocation
has shown that the way residents use, perceive, and attach value to their
5. In addition to the obvious conclusion that Charlestown residents may
have practical economic reasons to remain in their community, and must
know (or at least recognize) a great many of their neighbors, researchers
have shown in multivariate analyses that certain indiczators, such as
average lengths of residence and low rates of moving within two years,
can be used as proxies for use of local facilities, participation in
local affairs, expressed satisfaction, etc. Jon Burkhardt, especially,
has several useful articles on this.
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surroundings is a much more subtle matter, and that social interaction
of the kind usually emphasized may not be present in neighborhoods
that are otherwise highly prized by their residents. Some people, for
example, value not having to relate to neighbors, except perhaps in
times of emergency. 6 This is a complex issue which cannot be resolved
here. For now, we argue that single indicators of neighborhood quality,
strength, desirability, or whatever, are not adequate. "Social
cohesiveness" may prove to be one more middle-class myth of the optimal
community that will eventually retire to a lesser place in the planner's
lexicon.
D. Housing Market Characteristics
Housing market characteristics are the most susccptible to analysis, as
there are many readily obtainable sources of information. However, more
confusion seems to arise in this area than in any other. Part of the
problem is that individual sources are rarely complete in the terms
required, and conclusions must be inferred from comparison of much data.
Conclusions about future resources are almost always based upon experience
judgment, with numbers providing a lead rather than definitive projections
Reliable, strict quantitative methods are lacking, and, even if they
existed, would probably prove too complex for general applications.
In the past, standard agency practice had been to compile daily
newspapers or realtor listings until enough units within the cost and
size requirements were shown to have been advertised. No account was
taken of competition for available units, the presumption being that
each one listed could be obtained by a relocatee. Seasonal variations
6. Suzanne Keller has provided some good examples of this: The Urban
Neighborhood (Random House, 1968)
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each one listed could be obtained by a relocatee. Seasonal variations
and other demand fluctuations were not considered. What had been listed
in the recent past was presumed to be what would be listed in the
future. No relocation plans ever showed housing resources to be
deficient.
The guidelines are quite explicit, and the logic of the methodology
should be self-explanatory. All of the items have been applied on
numerous projects, and the results of housing market projections have
been repeatedly tested against actual relocation experience. The problem
has not been lack of data, and the projections have proven accurate
except where there have been substantial changes in local demand.
Examples of factors whose influence has been extremely difficult to
predict include shifts in mortgage availability and interest rates, or
city-wide revaluations. Under these conditions, which recently occured
in Worcester, rentals in desirable neighborhoods became scarcer than
anticipated, while the market for sales was more favorable to the buyer
than expected, (due largely to high tax increases on single family homes.)
Some general observations about housing markets, from relocation
experience, may be worth noting:
1) Rental costs for units of similar size, physical condition, public
and commercial amenities, clearly differ between neighborhoods, and
may also differ within neighborhoods by household type and length of
residence. The differences between neighborhoods may be due to crime
rates, assessment differences, quality of schools, general accessibility,
quiet v. noisy streets, etc., but may also be largely due to the social
preferences of landlords. Many landlords in older, stable urban
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neighborhoods are quite willing to trade less rent for what +hey consider
to be a desirable tenant. They may also charge more to an incoming
tenant than an existing one, and may further differentiate by type
of household, some charging female-headed households, large families,
or young couples more than husband headed, smaller, or older households.
The particular nature of the differentiation largely depends upon the
individual landlord, but the general practice is widespread. It may not
be observed in the initial rent-up, but is clearly observable in rental
structure over time (different increases, for example) and cannot be
explained by any one variable (such as length of residence). Housing
market segmentation, or discrimination, is a reality some households
experience by price as well as geography. The implication for relocation
is that it might be much more costly, and difficult, for certain
households to replace what they have than overly broad or static views
of the market would indicate.
2) Realtors (in addition to being the best source of information to the
analyst on competition, length of time units are available, and demand
characteristics in particular areas) exert an enormous influence on
housing markets in certain neighborhoods, even when they are not
involved in actually selling or renting a property. Landlords will
frequently call a realtor, or observe realtor listings, for advice on
how much to advertise for rent. The landlord may list a property with
a realtor, as well as advertise on his or her own. Realtors handle a
larger number of properties directly in white, urban neighborhoods with
a rising vacancy rate, as landlords must rely on their cleverness to
exclude "undesirables". Such is the case in Roslindale and Hyde Park
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now, as families are alledgedly fleeing the busing crisis. In areas
where there is a great deal of competition, and units rent rapidly,
landlords can easily substitute prospective tenants end thus have a ready-
made excuse that would be difficult to refute. The result of realtor
involvement, directly or indirectly, is that in spite of highly fragmented
ovnership, prices may not be so competitively based, as realtors
capitalize on control over a larger segment of the market, and manage
their advice accordingly. In some cases, entire neighborhoods are
dominated by a single realtor. Collusion between realtors is also not
uncommon. (Multiple listings are a perfect example of potcntial ologopoly
not dependent upon actual ownership.)
3) The low cost rentals of two and three family dwellings in stable
urban neighborhoods are the hardest to replace. Since vacancy rates
are a de facto indicator of stability and attractiveness, it has become
axiomatic that households displaced from the desirable urban neighborhoods
will have few, if any, choices to replace what they had. They will
almost always pay more for the same or less than what they had prior to
displacement. Relocation programs implicitly recognize this by providing
payment for increased rental costs, but only over a four year period.
Arguments that households displaced from such neighborhoods have
"upgraded" themselves because they occupy a higher cost dwelling are
therefore completely shallow. Planning which analyzes available housing
by type, cost, size, and location will point out, at least, these and
other relationships between acquired and available homes. A study of
housing in Worcester, for example, showed available units to be
clustered in poorer, less stable neighborhoods, in higher density
Awellings, costing more by size and for the few available' in comparable
neighborhoods, and located in higher proportion along busily traveled
streets than the homes to be acquired.
E. Analysis and Correlation of Data
The next step in the technical analysis is to correlate household
relocation needs with the housing market resources anticipated in
comparable neighborhoods. Where deficiencies in the required relocation
housing are apparent, then additional work must be done to ascertain
the number of, and suitability of sites to which acquired structures may
be moved or new ones built if necessary. Even when last resort
replacement housing is not eventually required, this latter exercise may
be useful to the relocation program as it will provide the location of
vacant, residentially zoned properties to which homeowners might
voluntarily move their dwellings. Housemoving is often an economically
as well as socially desirable solution, when possible. Displaced
households may remain in their familiar area and tynically pay only
60-70 per cent of the acquired value of their home to accomplish land
purchase, structure move, reinstallation and replacement of infrastructure,
and landscaping.
This section of the guidelines also calls for investigation of
development possibilities for displaced businesses and institutional
facilities.
F. Community Participation
In addition to personal contact with each affected business-
person, local agency and elected officials, realtors and others
knowledgeable of local housing and business conditions, a special
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reeting has been held with relocatees during the course of EIS development,
Each household and business potentially displaced (under all considered
alternatives) is informed by letter of the purpose, date, time and
location of the meeting. Objectives of the meeting have been as
follows:
1) To inform households and businesses of potential impacts, and to
invite comments on the overall project as well as their particular
concerns.
2) To encourage households and businesses to review the draft EIS and
to submit written comments they may think appropriate. All written
comments on the draft must be responded to in the Final EIS.
3) To describe the relocation laws and regulations, and to respond to
questions of concern, in the hope that potential relocatees will a) not
be bilked by speculators or others who would take advantage of their
uncertainty, b) not move precipitously and forfeit relocation payments,
c) not neglect property or fail to make needed or desired improvements,
since if the project goes ahead full fair market value is paid for
acquired property and this amount would be diminished by neglect, and
d) carry on business as usual until the time of their acquisition,
since adequate lead time is allowed for relocation from that point.
To my knowledge, Massachusetts is the only state which holds a
meeting specifically for households and businesses potentially displaced.
Initially, the opponents of such a meeting, or any early contact, had
taken the position (formerly embodied in federal regulations) that
potential relocatees should not be disturbed until a final design is
determined. It was argued that early contact would unnecessarily
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frighten families, arousing a premature opposition to the rcad and
obstructing rational evaluation of alternatives. Some others suggested
that the general public meeting schedule already required in EIS
preparation provided adequate opportunity for such households to
participate.
In response to the former position, staff of the relocation planning
section conducted a study of requests to the Department of Public Works
for early acquisition because of hardship from residents in a number of
communities affected by pending facilities. In only one of the six
communities studied - Chicopee - had individual household interviews
and a detailed survey of relocation needs been completed at the time.
In the path of the other proposed highways, most families had not been
officially contacted. Controlling for type of neighborhood (urban-rural,
stable-declining), lengths of residence, tenure, and household type,
the analysis showed Chicopee households to be less anxious to resolve
their situation through the early acquisition process. There had been
proportionately fewer hardship requests in Chicopee overall, and in
those submitted there were fewer references than in other communities
to psychological stress caused by uncertainty. Neighborhood deterioration
was cited less in Chicopee than in the other communities as a factor
contributing to the request for taking. The study concluded:
"These findings indicate that early individual contacts
(over two years previous) do not increase apprehension nor
lead to neighborhood neglect. In fact, such contacts may
reduce anxiety by informing people of the relocation process
and benefits and demonstrate that problems of displacement
are being considered."
In counter to the second position, that public participation
mechanisms were already adequate, the Relocation Planning Section argued
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that potential relocatees were not representing themselves at public
meetings. Informed discussion of relocation impacts rarely entered
the public record. Few potential relocatees were participating and.
those who did were not well informed of the relocation process, either
with respect to its impacts or benefits.
When relocatee meetings were finally held, these arguments were
substantiated by survey of the households who attended. On the average,
less than one-half to one-third of potential relocatees ever attend a
public meeting prior to the special relocatee session. Almost none have
any prior knowledge of relocation programs, and many were not even
aware of the project which affected them. Their response to having the
meetings has been overwhelmingly favorable, although they are not always
happy with what's said and are especially disappointed that definitive
dates for the progress of the project are never able to be given. On
protracted projects, some state they have waited years to hear some
straight talk on what might happen to them, or to know whether they
might be affected at all.
Thus far, Massachusetts D.P.W. has supported the meetings and they
are now a formal requirement of the agency's federally approved procedures
for public participation (the "Action Plan"). Part of the support,
no doubt, derives from the fact that the agency wishes to avoid
embarrassment from speakers at formal public hearings, and from local
elected officials. In the past it was charged that affected persons had
not been aware of the project and that the agency was trying to subvert
opposition in this way. While it may be argued that the participation
of potential relocatees is not as "effective" as it might be, the first
steps toward accountability to them in public have been taken.
IV Comment on Methodologi es for Planning Practice
There is clearly a need for explicit methodologies to assess the
impacts of proposed public actions. Public agency staff and consultants
caught in the perplexities of ever changing criteria for environmental
impact statements, lack a systematic approach and clear technical methods
for their work. The general quality of analyses, particularly in
economic and social impacts, is unfortunate testament to the problem.
Decision makers and the public overall regard conclusions with suspicion,
if they regard them at all, as technical views may be masked by the
closed rationale of "expert" judgment or are simply not responsive to
the impacts.
In Massachusetts, guidelines for a method of work and techniques for
analysis have been applied to one area of impact assessment. In spite
of initial resistance, due largely to the legacy of softer practices
in the past, consultants under contract to the state have applauded
the guidelines for providing clear direction to their work, which has
allowed more rational budgeting and concrete expectations for the
product. Agency staff, other than those involved in bureaucratic
infighting within the functional discipline,- have been in unanimous
support of the guidelines, although like consultants they had objected
in the beginning.
The guidelines have resulted in reports, interdisciplinary appli-
cations, and public participation that has, in our judgment,
significantly increased the influence of relocation matters in project
decisions and allowed more effective preparation for the inevitable
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relocation programs. With consultants providing technical data on
anticipated impacts, staff of the Relocation Planning Section have been
able to apply more informed judgment and to concentrate on developing
means to more effectively assist displaced persons, such as through
last resort replacement housing, structure moving, etc. (these efforts
have not been discussed, but they comprise the largest share of staff
working time).
Unfortunately, not all the technical methods have been developed and
applied with equal clarity. Particularly in the area of housing
market analysis, there appears to be at present no substitute for
experienced judgment to synthesize and draw conclusions from the data,
although the information base is fairly complete and open ~to scrutiny.
In spite of the guidelines apparent success, there seems to be no
end to the attempts to alter their contents in a way that would render
the methodology ineffectual. It may be necessary in other states, and
perhaps in Massachusetts, to have a Relocation Planning function outside
of Right of Way, within overall environmental and project development
disciplines. This implies an extremely unfortunate trade-off. The
main advantage of the present structuring is that planning and implemen-
tation concerns are undifferentiable. Planning methods are constantly
tested in practical application, while involvement in the implementation
of relocation programs breeds new and refined planning techniques.
Unfortunately, there appear to be very few administrators, particularly
within the Federal Highway Administration, who wish to manage the
problem in such a wholistic fashion. Perhaps too there aren't many
persons with planning backgrounds who want to tackle the problems
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of bureaucratic infighting, which confront attempts to put new analytic
methods into day to day agency practice.
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METHOD OF WORK
The following guidelines have been prepared by the Massachusetts De-.
partment of Public Works to be used by consultants in the preparation
of Environmental Impact Statements and other required studies. The
purpose of this study of relocation needs and resources is to influence
location and design work at the earliest stage of the planning process.
The findings of relocation analyses will be presented as "impacts due to
displacement" for each alternative being considered. In applying these
guidelines, level of detail will depend upon the magnitude and type of
relocation involved. For example, on projects involving few relocations
a detailed neighborhood evaluation may not be required. (see section III
A submission of the Preliminary Report on Relocation Needs and Resources
will be made to the Relocation Planning Section, Right of Way Bureau, un
der separate cover, prior to submission of the Preliminary Draft EIS/Lo-
cation Study. This timing will allow the consultant to perform addi-
tional work as required, and will allow the Department sufficient time
to prepare the final Conceptual State Relocation Program Plan and Anal-
ysis of Impacts Due to Displacement Prior to public hearings.
The Relocation Planning Section will review consultant proposals and
participate in contract negotiations. After a contract has been nego-
tiated and signed, work will proceed as follows:
Consultant develops with Relocation Planning Section detailed
work program for relocation and neighborhood impact studies.
Consultant maintains continuing contact with Relocation Plan-
ning Section which provides assistance in conduct of studies;
Relocation Planning Section monitors technical work, applica-
tion of study findings to engineering work.
Consultant submits data inventory, draft report on relocation
needs and resources, for review by Relocation Planning Section
which directs consultant to perform additional work as required,
Relocation Planning Section prepares, from consultant draft
Preliminary Report on Relocation Needs and Resources plus ad-
ditional analysis, final Conceptual Stage Relocation Program
Plan for submission to FHWA, inclusion in EIS
The analysis of relocation problems and proposed solutions to be devel-
oped by the Department is based on the legal requirements for relocation
Standards are provided in the Federal Uniform Relocation and Real Prop-
erty Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, FHWA PPM 81-1 and 81-1.5. (Last
Resort Replacement Housing). These requirements are summarized in Ap-
pendix I.
±± 
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I. Inventory of structures, dwelling units, 'commercial establishments
and farms
A. A complete inventory of structures potentially taken under
each alternative (as used in contract or EIS), including
structures affected by interchanges, widening or modifica-
tion of existing streets, as well as takings for the main
facility, showing: structure type, description, approximate
value, estimated condition, location (community, neighbor-
hood, street).
B. An estimate of the number of-dwelling units and tenure of
households, including: number of dwelling units in each
residential structure affected (estimate number vacant);
estimated tenure (own or rent) or occupants in each resi-
dential unit.
C. An accounting of the number of businesses (include farms)
and name of each business, including: number of businesses
in each commercial structure, location (community, neigh-
borhood, street).
Plans showing right of way limits, indentifying each structure tabulated
in the inventory, are to be included (200' scale), as well as photo-
graphs of affected structures.
II. Descrition of households and businesses affected, preliminary i-
dentification of relocation needs
A. A general description of household characteristics -- from
census tract and block data and from other secondary sour-
ces. The compilation should show the proportion which af-
fected households represent within each tract and block
population. Tract and block data encompassing affected
households should be compiled by neighborhood and communi-
ty and compared with tract and block data aggregated for
the political subdivision and county (or SMSA). As a min-
imum, complete census block information should be compiled
and computations done where necessary. From census block
and selected tract information, estimates are to be made
of the number of one person, female headed, elderly, and
large family households affected and the probable range of
their incomes. Estimates are to be made of the number of
minority households, non-English speaking households and
signigicant presence of ethnic groups.
Individual owners' lengths of residence can be obtained
from date of last sale in the Registry of Deeds, as well
as information on martgage amounts and discharge. Lists
of Polls are maintained by most cities and towns, provid-
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ing the number of persons of voting age at each residence
and in some cases, ages and occupations. City Directories
may also provide age and occupations of residents, and
this information would be of particular importance in iden-
tifying those affected who may be retired or in low paying
jobs. A list of the names and addresses of affected occu-
pants shall be coimpiled and presented with the information
available from the above sources. (See sample graphics Ap-
pendix I).
B. A general description of business characteristics -- from
available sources such as census of business, chamber of
commerce, industrial coamission, regional planning, other
publications and reports of local agencies. The descrip-
tion will include when available, the following for each
business:
-- type of business (retail, manufacturing, service, whole-
sale) include SIC code
-- tenure (own/rent) and estimated length of residence
-- approximate floor area
-- estimated number of employees; employment composition
(include number of minority employees)
-- general location, utility, service requirements
-- estimated rental or tax rate and land values
The above information should be obtained from individual
contacts with affected business people, when the business
people are willing to meet with consultants and give in-
formation. If they are not, the above-mentioned secondary
sources must be used.
Anticipated problems with location, utilities, zoning, ser-
vices (such as truck access, drainage agreements, special
casements, etc.), franchises, or licenses should be iden-
tified. Existing and projected market conditions for sim-
ilar businesses in the area are to be discussed, focussing
on trade area, business rate of entry, vacancies in exis-
ting structures, and available land suitable for develop-
ment.
C. The impact on potentially displaced schools, churches, o-
ther public and private institutional facilities, as well
as their possible plans for relocation, are to be discussed
on an individual basis with representatives of the affected
facility and Department of Public Works officials. Possi-
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bilities for functional replacement of public facilities
are to be noted.
D. Other sources -- In addition to the above sources, the know
ledge of local representatives, planning agencies, communi-
ty groups, and area residents participating in the planning
process should be utilized to expand and refine descrip-
tions gathered from secondary sources.
III. Neighborhood characteristics
Important in accessing relocation needs are relationships ex-
ternal to the houeholds; for example, the way residents use,
preceive, and attach value to their immediate surroundings, and
their preferences for locating in particular areas. Thcse re-
lationships are difficult to measure without comprehensive sur-
veys. However, through local contacts and the use of indica-
tors of neighborhood characteristics, a reasonable analysis of
the affected neighborhood and a comparison to other areas of
the community can be made. Census data must be obtained and
computations done so that such analysis may be made. Appen-
dix II is a partial list of census information, to be applied
as appropriate to particular projects.
All of the material suggested in Appendix II may be obtained
from census publications. The Department, through the Bureau
of Transportation Planning and Development, may provide add-
itional census material for analysis, when available (e.g.
Fourth Count Housing Tapes). Data should be compiled by tract
and compared to community and SMSA totals. Indicators of
neighborhood stability and attractiveness should be discussed
(mapped where appropriate) to the extent information is avail-
able, including census data; crime rates; street traffic (chil-
dren's crossings); proximity to shopping and public transpor-
tation, churches, health facilities, playgrounds, open space
and recreation facilities; quality of schools and housing.
Although certain plans will require compiling a substantial
volume of censys and other available information, consultants,
in cooperation with the Relocation Planning Section, will con-
centrate on developing data most relevant to the particular
project. For example, on smaller projects, much of the census
material would be of limited value, while detailed field ob-
servations of neighborhoods will be more feasible.
IV. Housing Market Characteristics
The survey of housing market characteristics is to focus on
housing available in the private market which is of structure
type, cost (or rent), size, and in a neighborhood comparable
to structures to be acquired. Resources in public and pub-
licly-assisted housing are to be documented through contacts
with the local housing -authority and managers of individual
projects. Contacts with realtors and others knowledgeable
of local housing are to be documented by name and time of con-
tact.
Wherever available, the housing market survey is to include as
a minimum the following:
1. Sample newspaper and periodical listings of homes for sale
and rent by structure type, cost, size and location. The
sample should be selected over at least a one-year period
to allow for seasonal variations and daily or weekly list-
ings spaced far enough apart to eliminate repetition. A
coded plotting of available units on a map of the commun-
ity is essential and should show the proportion of identi-
fiable locations to total listings. Length of time units
available should be ascertained from comparison of contin-
uous listings.
2. Detailed information on new construction: building pcr-
mits issued by structure type (at least over the past five
years); planned new construction (contact area builders,
building inspectors, local planning officials, developers,
public housing officials, HUD, MHFA).
3. Comments from area realtors and compilation of multiple
listings (if available). A number of realtors should be
contacted to obtain as complete a picture as possible of
area housing market conditions, with discussion focusing
on volume of recent past sales and rental turnover by type,
cost, size and location; present availability by type, cost
size and location; competition for available units by type,
cost, size and location (including length of time units are
available); high demand areas and special curcumstances
which may affect relocation. If possible, the local Real
Estate Transfer Directory should be obtained and sales over
the previous complete year and recent months plotted by
type, cost, size and location.
4t. Information from local banks, utility companies, etc., for
mortgage and other housing cost information. Information
from community assessors and others to obtain tax rates,
rates of assessment, real variations in particular sections.
5. Information on availability of public and publicly-assisted
housing; vacancies; waiting lists; turnovers; size and rent-
of available units; admissions criteria (family size and
income); description of projects (e.g. density, neighborhood
±±
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public and commercial services available, comparability to
structures to be acquired, location and size of project).
6. Information on other projects involving displacement; re-
cent and anticipated relocation: problems experienced by
relocation agency. Where -data is available (DPW or Re-
development Authority files) recent past relocations should
be plotted by type, size, location, tenure, and cost of pre-
relocation vs. post-relocation housing.
7. Information from census and other reports; changes in to-
tal supply and characteristics of the housing stock are to
be noted by comparing 1970 with 1960 census data. Region-
al and local housing market and related studies may be used
to supplement primary sources.
V. Analysis and Correlation of Data
Information developed in sections I-IV is to be correlated such
that an analysis may be made of comparable housing and business
resources in neighborhoods potentially suitable for relocatees.
The analysis of relocation needs and resources may show problems
which can be avoided by design and location adjustments. Other
solutions may include replacement housing and joint development
provisions for displaced businesses.
A. Development possibilities for business and institutional
facilities
Possible innovative means including provision of excess land
from facility takings to accommodate displaced business and
institutional facilities are to be developed. Community
resources are to be discussed including: professional ex-
pertise, assistance from local officials and agencies, land
potentially suitable for development, potential rehabilita-
tion of existing structures, etc. Opportunities for and
constraints to functional replacement are to be discussed
in detail.
B. Replacement Housing
Sites potential for the location of replacement housing are
to be identified and described in relation to existing sur-
roundings, zoning, site features and access, proximity to
shopping and local community facilities, proximity to pub-
lic transportation, land values, pending or possible com-
peting development, history of attempted development (re-
quested zoning variances and results, permits requested,
etc.), possible environmental impacts. Possibilities for
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structure moving are to be explored, a in many cases this
will be a valuable resource for replacement housing. Land
in the immediate area owned by DPW and outside proposed
rights of way should be identified. Local officials and
representatives of other public agencies should be contact-
ed to explore possibilities for the use of publicly-owned
or tax title land for replacement housing or other facili-
ties.
VI. Community Participation
Preliminary findings of relocation needs and resources are to
be presented at public informational meetings by the consultant.,
A special meeting with persons potentially displaced and others
will be held, in accordance with Action Plan procedures.
It will be the responsibility of the consultant to contact af-
fected occupants under direction of the Relocation Planning
Section, Right of Way Bureau, and to distribute the information
in accordance with Action Plan procedures.
Engineering drawings depicting possible takings are to be shown,1
to whatever detail they we developed, at all public-informa-
tional meetings. The consultant should document by name, tilme,
and summary report all contacts made with potential relocatees.
LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
FOR HOUSING AVAILABILITI
153
154
Legal and Administrative Requirements for Housing Availability
Simply stated, relocation programs express a relationship between the
housing needs of displacees and the availability of housing to meet
those needs. . Relocation is most easily accomplished, and choice is
afforded for replacement housing, when housing market activity matches
relocation needs and when the addditional demand created by displacement
is small enough to be absorbed without severe consequence to the overall
market or some segment of the market. It follows, therefore, that the
kind of housing desired by relocatees must be available in sufficient
numbers to assure that relocation needs and preferences will be adequately
provided for. Unfortunately, precise needs and preferences cannot be
determined at this early stage, nor can the availability of suitable
housing be estimated with strict accuracy. However, past experience
has shown that most households seek homes comparable to what they owned
or rented prior to relocation, and FHJA has adopted standards of
b "comparable replacement housing" that reflect, in part, such experience.
This criterion, as well as additional federal and state standards for
relocation housing, are applied to the extent possible in determining
at this preliminary stage the probable availability of housing for
potential relocatees. The following factors are considered:
* Number and type of dwellings affected, tenure and size
of households, age and other characteristics of
affected residents.
* Location and approximate value of dwellings to be
acquired.
* Housing market characteristics - new construction
(housing production), volume of past activity
(turnover), newspaper listings and census counts
(price, distribution and location of vacancies), and
comments of realtors and others knowledgeable in
area housing (local conditions).
* Neighborhood characteristics.
Federal law (Uniform Relocation Act of 1970), state law (Chapter 79A,
Massachusetts General Laws), regulations of the Federal Highway
Administration (PPM 81-1), and regulations of the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Public Works and Bureau of Relocation provide that any highway
project that will involve the relocation of families or individuals must
assure the following:
* There will be available sufficient decent, safe, and
sanitary homes for sale and rent, adequate to meet
the needs of each family to be relocated and within
their financial means. In determining whether suffici t
suitable housing will be available for relocation, the
following criteria are applied (required by federal or
state regulaticn):
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- Replacement housing must be decent, safe and
sanitary, as defined by Article II, Massachusetts
Sanitary Code.
- The cost of replacement houses (gross housing
costs - mortgage or rent plus heat and utilities)
must be within the financial means of households
to be relocated. As a minimum, gross housing costs
per year are not to exceed 25 per cent of gross
annual income.
- Housing meeting the above standards must be avail-
able in locations that are in the same general area
(as a minimum, within trhe same community),
accessible to the relocatee's place of employment,
in a neighborhood that is equal to or better than
the one in which he lives, comparable with regard
to public utilities, public and commercial
facilities, etc., and adequate to acccmmodate any
of his special needs.
- Replacement dwellings must be at least comparable
to dwellings to be acquired, with respect to number
of rooms, area of living space, type of construction
age, and state of repair.
- Each household must have, as a minimum, three
suitable choices for relocation.
* These criteria are applied to the overall supply of
housing anticipated to. become available, and in later
phases - prior to the right-of-way acquisition -
estimates of available housing suitable to the needs
of relocatees would be developed "to the extent
necessary to assure that a relocation plan can be
expeditiously and fully implemented," and to satisfy
all: requirements of state law and regulations of the
Massachusetts Bureau of Relocation. Under federal
law, if sufficient suitable dwellings could not be
anticipated to become available in existing housing,
then new housing must be built as necessary to
accommodate all relocatees.
* Recent legislation upheld in an opinion of the Attorney
General expressly grants the Department of Public Works
authority to construct replacement structures, acquire
and dispose of land for replacement housing and other
structures, and take other actions necessary to comply
with the Uniform Relocation Act of 1970.
-H
SELECTED CENSUS TRACT DATA
FOR NEIGHBORHOOD EVALUATION
156
The following is a guide to the kinds of information that may be
obtained from the census to permit an evaluation cf the affected neigh-
borhood:
1. Population characteristics
- total population 1970; changes 1960-1970
- racial composition 1970; significant presence of ethnic groups;
changes 1960-1970
- age distribution 1970; change in proportion of persons under 18,
over 62; changes 1960-1970
- average household size, 1970; change 1960-1970
- education, median number of years completed, % high school
graduates, % school attendees enrolled in college, 1970; changes 1
1960-1970
- predominant occupational types, 1970; changes 1960-1970
2. Income characteristics
- median household income 1970; median income of families 1970;
median. income of unrelated individuals, 1970
- % distribution 1bY $5,000 increments; % paying 25/ or less of income
for rent for each $5,000 increment
- 1 of all households with income below poverty level; % homeowners
with income below poverty level; % household heads over 65 with
income below poverty level; % unrelated individuals with income
below poverty level
3. Residential mobility and transportation
- proportion of persons in residence less than two years, two to
five years, six to 10, 11 to 20, over 20 years; median length
of residence; changes 1960-1970
- auto ownership 1970, by owners, renters; means of transportation
to work
4. Housing characteristics
- total dwelling units
- % 1-unit structures; 2-unit; 3-4 unit; 5-49; 50 plus; 1970,
changes 1960-1970
- % owner-occupied 1970; change 1960-1970
- % renter-occupied 1970; change 1960-1970
- % vacant 1970; change 1960-1970
vacant and for sale, 1970, number and %
Vacant less than 6 months, %
median price asked
vacant for rent, 1970, number and %
vacant less than 2 months, %
median rent asked
- median # rooms per dwelling unit; average # rooms per d/u
- median # persons per d/u (by owners and renters)
- condition of stock - % lacking some or all plumbing
- overcrowding: 1.01 or more persons per room; change 1960-1970
- value of owner-occupied units - median and % distribution 1970
- contract rent and gross rent - median and % distribution 1970
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